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Like much of life, the study of bankruptcy is the study of leverage.
Chapter 11 of the United States Bankruptcy Code' (the "Code" or the
"Bankruptcy Code") may be appropriately described as providing a frame-
work within which interested parties may negotiate solutions to the problems
facing a troubled company. The allocation of leverage to the negotiating par-
ties is critical to the ultimate outcome of the process. In any negotiation
setting' control over the bargaining process is a key item of leverage. This
Article proposes a framework for analysis and suggests solutions to the prob-
lem of control over corporations during the pendency of a Chapter 11 reorga-
nization case.
The provisions of Chapter 11 distribute negotiating leverage to each of
the participants in the process and provide default rules in case of a break-
down in the bargaining. Control over the bargaining process is allocated to the
pre-bankruptcy management of the business, through the fictitious institution
known as the "debtor in possession." 2 Management's control goes beyond
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1. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1174 (1988).
2. 11 U.S.C. § 1101 defines "debtor in possession" as being the "debtor" unless a
trustee has been appointed. The "debtor" is the entity that is the subject of the bankruptcy case.
11 U.S.C. § 101(12) (1988). For most purposes, the debtor in possession can be regarded
simply as the pre-bankruptcy corporation with special rights and obligations under the
Bankruptcy Code. See NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513, 528 (1984); Raymond T.
Nimmer & Richard B. Feinberg, Chapter 11 Business Governance: Fiduciary Duties, Business
Judgment, Trustees and Exclusivity, 6 BANKR. DEV. J. 1, 20-37 (1989) (providing an expand-
ed view of the debtor in possession). Nimmer and Feinberg see the nature of the debtor in pos-
session as being the central question of corporate governance. This Article does not contest this
notion. Instead, this paper is intended to expand on the general ideas contained in Nimmer and
Feinberg's work by exploring the effectiveness of the duties imposed on the debtor in posses-
sion in replacing the governance structures existing outside of the Chapter 11 process.
11 U.S.C. § 1107(a) (1988) provides that the "debtor in possession" has all of the
rights, powers, and obligations of a trustee under the Code. Thus, although most of the provi-
sions of the Code refer to the "trustee," they can be read to mean "debtor in possession" in most
cases. When such provisions are referred to herein, the author has substituted the term "debtor
in possession" where appropriate.
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day-to-day operational decisions to reach issues regarding fundamental
changes in the asset and liability structure of the company.3
Though most of the negotiations in a Chapter 11 reorganization revolve
around the development of a plan of reorganization that effects the complete
business and financial restructuring of the business, many other substantial
issues must be resolved outside of the context of the plan. Bankruptcies take
time - often a long time.4 Given this reality, and the desirability of continuing
the operations of the business during the reorganization process, necessity
dictates that some strategic decisions be made outside of the plan process.
For example, decisions involving the terms and desirability of financing the
business operations, the assumption of executory contracts, and the need to
sell substantial business assets may need to be reached well before the com-
pletion of the plan negotiations.
Often these decisions directly reach the fundamental asset deployment
and financial restructuring issues that the plan process is intended to resolve.
Unlike the plan process, however, the decisionmaking structure cannot be
premised on fully negotiated solutions. Instead, the system must be based, to
some extent, on delegation of authority with concomitant monitoring and lines
of responsibility.
The management of a bankrupt company enjoys primacy in this deci-
sion making scheme for at least two reasons. First, management, by virtue of
its past day-to-day control over the operational aspects of the corporation's
business, enjoys huge informational advantages. Second, the myriad transac-
tions that must be entered to operate a business during a reorganization all
require some central party to carry on at least initial negotiations with the third
party involved in the deal. These factors combine to make management per-
haps the most powerful group in the bankruptcy process.
The problem of control over business decisions has been the subject of
commentary, case law, and statutory development. An entire structure of
corporate governance has developed outside of the Chapter 11 process.
Outside of bankruptcy, managers are exhorted to act as fiduciaries for the
owners of the corporation and are subject to removal through a scheme rely-
ing on contract and market forces. The system responds to concerns that
managers will hold incentives that may conflict with those held by the owners
3. The most obvious instance of debtor control over the bankruptcy process is the
180-day period in which the "debtor" has the exclusive right to propose a plan of reorganization.
11 U.S.C. § 1121(b) (1988). TIis so-called "exclusivity period" enables management to control
the negotiations over the plan of reorganization by allowing this group to act as a clearinghouse
for the complex web of deals that characterize the process. See infra text accompanying notes
28-43. The mere fact that management has the day-to-day authority to operate the business dur-
ing the pendency of a Chapter 11 proceeding gives rise to more subtle means of control and cor-
responding leverage that may be of greater moment than the exclusivity period, however. This
paper is primarily concerned with management's control over the business during the plan nego-
tiation process.
4. For example, the reorganization of the Johns-Manville Corporation consumed 4.3
years from the filing of the petition initiating the case to the confirmation of the plan of reorgani-
zation. See Lynn M. LoPucki & William C. Whitford, Bargaining over Equity's Share in the
Bankruptcy Reorganization of Large, Publicly Held Companies, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 125, 176(1990).
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and attempts to insure that managers will act in the best interests of their
constituencies.
The need to align managers with owners exists inside of Chapter 11 as
well. If anything, the problems addressed by the general corporate gover-
nance system are heightened by business failure. Chapter 11 provides a cor-
porate governance structure designed to control the behavior of management
during the pendency of the reorganization case. Although Chapter ll's gov-
ernance system roughly corresponds to that existing outside of bankruptcy, the
special needs of the reorganization process severely limit the non-bankruptcy
system by eliminating contractual and market controls over management
behavior.
The elimination of these controls vitiates much of the non-bankruptcy
governance structure's effectiveness and may render owners unable to check
management misbehavior during the reorganization. Chapter 11 provides
some additional controls in the form of a representational structure and judicial
oversight that, in the abstract, could adequately address concerns over man-
agerial incentives. These controls, however, may be effective only in large
reorganizations with active owner participation. In cases involving smaller
corporations, managerial discretion over significant decisions may be
unchecked.
This Article recommends an approach to Chapter 11 decisionmaking
that relies heavily upon the teachings of financial economics. When presented
with a particular question that cannot be addressed through the plan negotia-
tion process, courts should look to the wishes of the residual owners of the
assets and income of the corporation whenever possible. If that group cannot
be found or for any reason does not participate in the decisionmaking process,
courts should make use of an impartial third party as fact finder and focal point
for significant decisions.
In support of this proposition, this Article examines the Chapter 11
corporate governance structure against the general principles informing the
non-bankruptcy system. Section I sets the stage with a general description of
the goals of Chapter 11, the process of negotiation among the owners of the
business, and several business decisions that require particular attention.
Section II describes the non-bankruptcy governance structure applicable to
corporations that are solvent and to corporations that are falling. Section III
describes the changes in this structure necessitated by the reorganization pro-
cess. Section IV critiques the bankruptcy governance structure in light of
principles underlying the non-bankruptcy system and the various theories of
the purpose of the reorganization process. Section V concludes with specific
recommendations for improvements in the method by which the bankruptcy
asylum is run.
I. THE CHAPTER 11 PROCESS - GOALS AND METHODS
For many corporations experiencing total financial failure, governance is
not a serious problem. The business operations of the corporation are discon-
1992]
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tinned and the assets are liquidated under Chapter 75 of the Code or under
state dissolution statutes. 6 Conflicts between creditors and shareholders are
governed by contract, and claimants simply are paid in the order of contrac-
tual priority.7 Any decisions regarding the appropriate method of liquidation
will be made by a bankruptcy trustee or state law counterpart under the
supervision of a court and with due regard to the claimants' wishes.
Chapter 11 reorganizations begin from a wholly different perspective.
On the assumption that keeping the assets intact will preserve "going concern
value,"8 Chapter 11 provides for a continuation of the business operations and
a financial restructuring rather than a liquidation. 9 This approach requires a
more complex structure for decisionmaking than does a simple liquidation.
Chapter 11 is designed to provide a forum and an impetus for negotia-
tions leiding to a complete financial and business'reorganization.10 Successful
reorganizations are usually characterized by negotiation rather than litigation,1'
and Chapter 11 fosters negotiation through rules designed to force the parties
to operate within the confines of the Chapter 11 case'2 and through default
rules that provide the baseline for negotiated solutions.' 3
5. 11 U.S.C. §§ 701-766 (1988).
6. See, e.g., DEL. GEN. CORP. LAW § 275 (1991).
7. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 726 (1988) (distribution of proceeds of estate). The Code
does change the non-bankruptcy priority scheme somewhat. See 11 U.S.C. § 507 (1988).
Claims of taxing entities are elevated in priority and limited special interest priorities are provided
under the Code. For the most part, however, the general non-bankruptcy priorities apply in
bankruptcy.
8. The term "going concern value" refers to the value of assets held together and used
in a business operation. This value is typically contrasted against "liquidation value," which is
generally defined as the value of the assets, sold on a piecemeal basis, less the costs of sale. See
generally Chaim J. Fortgang & Thomas M. Mayer, Valuation in Bankruptcy, 32 UCLA L.
REV. 1061, 1064 (1985). Reorganization policy is driven by the general assumption that going
concern value is higher than liquidation value. H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. 220
(1977) ("The premise of a business reorganization is that assets that are used for production in
the industry for which they were designed are more valuable than those same assets sold for
scrap."). This assumption bears testing on a case-by-case basis, however, because the excess of
liquidation value over going concern value should be taken as an indication that the assets can be
put to better use by another owner. Further, defining liquidation value as a piece-meal sale of
assets may be entirely inappropriate. Assets could be "liquidated" by sale to a single owner and
going concern value could be preserved in that way. See Douglas G. Baird, The Uneasy Case
for Corporate Reorganizations, 15 J. LEGAL STUD. 127 (1986).
9. H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 220 (1977).
10. "[N]egotiation among the parties after full disclosure will govern how the value of
the reorganizing company will be distributed among creditors and stockholders." Id. at 224.
11. See LoPucki & Whitford, supra note 4, at 137-41; Richard F. Broude, Cramdown
and Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code: The Settlement Imperative, 39 BUs. LAW. 441 (Feb.
1984).
12. The automatic stay, provided in 11 U.S.C. § 362 (1988), prohibits actions to col-
lect debt, enforce judgments, and exercise control over property of the estate. This provision
forces the parties to operate within the confines of the case. The automatic stay ensures that the
pre-bankruptcy owners will participate in the proceeding by stopping all creditor collection
efforts and interference with property of the estate. Because financial problems do not occur
overnight, the preference provisions of the Code provide a reach back to bring debts paid on the
eve of bankruptcy within the proceeding. These provisions make bankruptcy a truly collective
proceeding in which everyone must participate. See infra text accompanying notes 150-51.
13. Unlike its predecessor, the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, the Code allows parties to
waive the requirements of the absolute priority rule. If negotiations over the'allocation of value
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The Chapter 11 process addresses the two major concerns facing own-
ers14 of a troubled company.15 First, the basic management and economics of
the business must be rationalized by confronting the question of whether the
business assets are being utilized in the most efficient manner. Through
reflection upon business realities, owners may come to the conclusion that
closure and liquidation of the business is warranted, and Chapter 11 provides a
means through which this change may be effected. 16 Short of liquidation,
however, many other changes may be desirable. Owners may decide that
operations should be streamlined through the sale of discrete business units,
discontinuation of product lines, or the sale of single, inefficient assets.17
The second primary concern the Chapter 11 process addresses is how
the claims on,' 8 and interests in, 19 the assets of the business should be
restructured. The Code allows payment of such claims and interests in cash
or other property of the debtor,20 or in securities of the reorganized entity.21
Thus, preexisting claims and interests may be reconstituted in a way that is
consistent with the new asset structure of the business. Debt or equity claims
may be paid in cash, reduced, eliminated, or substantially changed in an effort
to develop a financial structure that can be supported by the expected cash
flow of the business operations. This aspect of the reorganization process is
the more difficult because claimants realize that they are involved in a zero
sum game in which dollars won by one group equal dollars lost by another.22
in the company fail, however, the Code imposes a rule of absolute priority. See infra text
accompanying notes 28-43.
14. This Article uses the term "owners" to include creditors as well as shareholders.
The use of the term "owners" to reflect both groups is not merely for convenience. One premise
of this Article is that the concept of "ownership" as carrying with it decisionmaking authority is
elusive when dealing with an insolvent corporation. We do not know who the "owners" ard, so
we must assume that everyone has a potential justification for claiming the title. Where neces-
sary to distinguish creditors and shareholders, this Article will use the more specific term.
15. See Douglas G. Baird & Thomas H. Jackson, Corporate Reorganizations and the
Treatment of Diverse Ownership Interests: A Comment on Adequate Protection of Secured
Creditors in Bankruptcy, 51 U. Cm. L. REV. 97, 104 (1984) [hereinafter Diverse Ownership
Interests].
16. 11 U.S.C. § 1123(b)(4) (1988) allows the parties to provide for the sale of all or
any part of the property of the estate under the plan of reorganization.
17. 11 U.S.C. § 363 (1988) allows the debtor in possession to use, sell, or lease
assets after noti6e and hearing. See infra text accompanying notes 66-69.
18. 11 U.S.C. § 101(4) (1988) defines "claim" broadly enough to include all "rights to
payment" from the debtor.
19. The term "interest" is not defined in the Code, but it refers to rights under common
or preferred shares. See 11 U.S.C. § 501(a) (1988) ("An equity security holder may file a proof
of interest.").
20. 11 U.S.C. § 1123(a)(5)(D).
21. Id. § 1123(a)(5)(J).
22. Negotiations over these two issues involve many competing interests. Concerns
over the appropriate deployment of assets obviously affect employees, suppliers, and other
dependents of the bankrupt corporation. The Code, at least facially, appears to ignore such
interests in favor of the protection of the interests of the actual "owners" of the business. Right
or wrong, this bias exists in the Code and, therefore, the analysis of these two questions will
revolve around the rights and positions of the owners - at least initially. See infra text accom-




Ideally, the two concerns should be addressed separately.23 The most
efficient deployment of assets exists independently of the ownership interests
in them. For instance, a corporation selling an obsolete product must put its
assets to a different use if it is ultimately to survive. If the assets required to
manufacture the product cannot be put to their most profitable use by the
reorganizing corporation, they must be sold to another entity - perhaps even
a scrap dealer - who can utilize them to their potential. This economic real-
ity is not changed by the fact that a sale of the assets will result in the realiza-
tion of losses by particular owners of the business.
The ability of one group of owners to manipulate asset deployment in an
attempt to obtain more favorable treatment in the financial restructuring may
lead to inefficient results. For example, creditors attempting to achieve full
payment of their claims may take actions that would result in the liquidation of
the business - even when the business should be continued as a going con-
cern. 24 Insuring that the procedure remains collective in nature goes a long
way toward controlling this behavior. The automatic stay25 prohibits individual
actions to collect debt and forces pre-bankruptcy owners to act as a single
owner would in making decisions regarding the appropriate deployment of
business assets.26
A collective procedure is not enough to insure rational decisionmaking,
however. The system also should allocate authority in a way that requires
decisionmakers to bear the costs of their decisions.21 Without such account-
ability, a system may lead to strategic decisions designed to benefit only the
decisionmakers and not the interested parties collectively. The system also
must address pragmatic concerns of speed and efficiency if it is to provide
realistic options to the parties. With these goals in mind, the following discus-
sion describes the context in which broad questions of asset deployment and
financial restructuring are addressed.
A. The Plan Process
Most of the negotiations in a Chapter 11 case revolve around the devel-
opment of a plan of reorganization that will set the terms of the restructuring. 28
The plan effects the financial restructuring of the business by classifying
claimants and shareholders into groups based on their pre-bankruptcy rights
and by providing the terms upon which the members of the classes will be
paid.29 Payment may be made in cash or property, or in new claims against
23. See Douglas G. Baird & Thomas H. Jackson, Bargaining after the Fall and the
Contours of the Absolute Priority Rule, 55 U. CHI. L. REv. 738, 787 (1988) [hereinafter
Absolute Priority Rule] ("Bankruptcy law should ensure that fights about who owns a fim's
assets should not undercut efforts to use them in the most beneficial way possible.").
24. See infa text accompanying notes 253-55.
25. 11 U.S.C. § 362 (1988). See supra note 12 for a discussion of the automatic stay.
26. See Diverse Ownership Interests, supra note 15, at 105.
27. See id. at 108.
28. See 11 U.S.C. §1123 (contents of a plan). The plan provides the financial struc-
ture of the reorganized entity as well as other provisions that will govern the company as it
emerges from the protection of the bankruptcy proceedings. Thus, the plan is the base restruc-




the assets of the business.30 Normally, however, the plan provides that pre-
bankruptcy owners will receive new debt or equity claims against the assets
of the reorganized business, rather than cash payments. 31
The plan also may provide for changes in the asset structure of the firm
through asset sales, 32 assumption or rejection of executory contracts,33 and
settlement or prosecution of claims owned by the debtor.34 With few excep-
tions, 35 the Code allows the parties to strike any bargain they desire.
These negotiations may be aptly characterized as a clash of priorities;
owners of differing priorities each seek to maximize their shares of the newly
reorganized entity. At the simplest level, bankruptcy conflicts normally will be
between creditors and shareholders of the business. As the number of levels
of debt and equity increase, however, the situation becomes more difficult.
Senior creditors may clash with junior creditors. Junior creditors may argue
with subordinated debenture holders. Equity holders may quarrel with every-
one. The configurations of alliance and conflict among the various classes of
claimants are limited only by the creativity of the participants and the com-
plexity of the firm's capital structure.
At bottom, the difficulties encountered in the negotiations all relate to
the question of how to allocate the value of the business assets when it is
unclear what that value is. The difficulties of valuing the business, and thus
valuing the various instruments under which the parties will continue their
ownership in the business, enable each class to assert an entitlement to a con-
tinued ownership interest based on their view of the corporation's business
prospects.
The Bankruptcy Code encourages and sets the stage for these negotia-
tions. The Code allows class waiver of the right to absolute priority,36 thereby
30. See supra text accompanying notes 20-21.
31. There are, of course, exceptions. Small creditors are often paid in cash because
their claims are too small to merit the issuance of reorganization securities. See 11 U.S.C. §
1122(b) (1988). Also, 11 U.S.C. § 1123(b)(4) permits liquidating plans in which the assets of
the business are sold and the proceeds distributed.
32. Id. § 1123(a)(5)(D); § 1123(b)(4).
33. Id. § 1123(b)(2).
34. Id. § 1123(b)(3).
35. When all of the owners agree to a course of action, the restrictions imposed on the
reorganized business are no greater than the legal restrictions imposed upon corporations operat-
ing outside of bankruptcy. See 11 U.S.C. § 525(a) (1988) (prohibition on discrimination by
governmental units against persons who have been debtors). Of course, the business must
comply with laws generally applicable to business operations. See THOMAS H. JACKSON, THE
LOGIC AND LMTS OF BANKRUPTCY LAW 152-53 (1986).
Chapter 11 contains provisions allowing a super-majority to bind all of the owners to a
particular course of action. See infra text accompanying notes 36-39. Where less than all of the
creditors have agreed to a course of action, dissenting creditors are protected by the "best inter-
ests of the creditors" rule contained in 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(7) (1988). This rule requires the
parties to allocate to the dissenting creditors at least what they would have received in a liquida-
tion of the business under Chapter 7.
36. The absolute priority rule was developed in the early part of this century in equity
receivership cases. Generally, the rule requires each class of creditors to be paid in full in cash
or in reorganization securities prior to receipt or retention by any junior class of any property or
interest in the reorganized business. Northern Pac. Ry. v. Boyd, 228 U.S. 482, 505-08
(1913). A corollary to the rule is that senior claims may not receive compensation in cash, prop-
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allowing junior owners to continue their ownership of the post-bankruptcy
business, even when the plan fails to compensate senior classes fully for their
prepetition claims. If plan negotiations fail to secure approval of all classes of
claims and interests, however, the absolute priority rule restricts the ability of
junior classes to continue their ownership of the business unless senior classes
are paid in full.37
The absolute priority rule provides a default rule against which the court
must measure the plan's allocation of value. This process, known as
"cramdown," requires the court to value38 the business enterprise, thereby
valuing the reorganization securities issued under the plan. These values then
must be measured against the owners' non-bankruptcy priorities to ensure
that the plan allocates reorganization securities to the owners in accordance
with those priorities. 39
Obviously this is a complex determination. 40 It is also fraught with
uncertainty and risk.41 In fact, the rule is so complex that its elimination
(except as a default rule operating only in the event of a breakdown in nego-
tiations) was one of the central features of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of
1978.42 The Chapter 11 process wisely leaves the fundamental decisions re-
garding asset deployment and financial restructuring to those economically
interested in the business.43 In so doing, the bankruptcy system generally
erty, or reorganization securities in an amount greater than their prepetition claims. See Kenneth
N. Klee, All You Ever Wanted to Know About Cram Down Under the New Bankruptcy Code,
53 AM. BANKR. LJ. 133 (1979) [hereinafter Cram Down 1]. The absolute priority rule was
significant in large reorganizations under Chapter X of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898. See, e.g.,
Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Prods. Co., Ltd., 308 U.S. 106, reh'g denied, 308 U.S. 637
(1939); Walter J. Blum, The Law and Language of Corporate Reorganization, 17 U. CHI. L.
REV. 565 (1950).
37. The absolute priority rule is codified at 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b) (1988). This section,
however, applies only in the event that an otherwise confirmable plan fails to obtain the accep-
tance of each class of claims or interests. See id. § 1129(a)(8). 11 U.S.C. § 1126(c) (1988)
provides that a class of claims is deemed to have accepted the plan if the plan is accepted by class
members holding two-thirds of the amount of claims in the class and one-half of the number of
claims in the class. 11 U.S.C. § 1126(d) provides a similar rule for acceptance of claims by
interest holders, but eliminates the one-half in number requirement.
38. The widely accepted valuation method is the capitalization of future earnings. See
Consolidated Rock Prod. Co. v Du Bois, 312 U.S. 510, 525 (1941). Using this method, the
court must determine the likely cash flow of the business over the foreseeable future and dis-
count that cash flow back to present dollars at a discount rate that reflects enterprise risk. Errors
in either variable may impact greatly the ultimate valuation. The process has been described as
"a guess compounded by an estimate." H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 222 (1977).
39. For an excellent discussion of cramdown in all of its various forms, see Cram
Down I, supra note 36; Kenneth N. Klee, Cram Down II, 64 AM. BANKR. L.J. 229 (1990)
[hereinafter Cram Down 11].
40. For an example of the complexity of a cramdown determination, see In re Jartran,
Inc., 44 B.R. 331 (Bankr. N.D. Ill., E.D. 1984).
41. See Nimmer & Feinberg, supra note 2, at 3-6.
42. H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 222-24 (1977).
43. The ability of a super-majority of class members to bind dissenting members to a
plan that does not comport with absolute priority should increase the chance that the rule will be
waived when it is rational to do so. See generally Mark J. Roe, The Voting Prohibition in Bond
Workouts, 97 YALE LJ. 232 (1987). By eliminating the ability of each creditor to withhold
approval of an economically sound plan as a strategic ploy for better treatment, the Code opens
the negotiating process to a wider range of possible distributions recognizing a wider variety of
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satisfies both the economic and pragmatic concerns stated earlier. Owners,
rather than judges, decide how to deploy the assets of the corporation and
how to divide their value.
B. Non-Plan Decisions and Transactions
Though most of the Chapter 11 process focuses on developing a plan of
reorganization, many decisions must be reached during plan negotiations to
keep the business operations afloat. These questions involve more than the
simple day-to-day operation of the business, however. They reach the
broader asset deployment and financial restructuring issues that are at the
heart of the entire process. The following discussion looks at three such deci-
sions: financing the debtor in possession, the assumption or rejection of execu-
tory contracts, and the sale of assets of the estate,
1. Postpetition Financing
The filing of a Chapter 11 petition often gives rise to a need for cash
approaching crisis proportions. Trade financing may become unavailable as
nervous creditors insist on cash on delivery instead of their normal trade
terms.4 If the business operations are to continue, employees must be paid
and supplies must be purchased. Added to these problems is the lack of free
cash in today's highly leveraged business environment. Under contemporary
commercial finance practices, lenders often hold security interests in substan-
tially all of the cash of their borrowers.4 5 Secured creditors with an interest in
cash collateral are protected against dissipation of the cash in the operation of
the business. 46 Thus, one of the first priorities in many cases is to secure a
source of financing.
The Code authorizes the debtor in possession to incur indebtedness in
the ordinary course of business.47 Postpetition creditors are entitled to
contributions and values. For example, under the Code, manager-shareholders may negotiate
for continued participation in the reorganized company on the basis of their skill in operating the
business even if the value of the business is not high enough to allow them to participate on
account of their pre-bankruptcy interests. If managers do, indeed, provide such value, senior
classes likely will recognize the contribution and provide a continued ownership interest in the
business as compensation. See Absolute Priority Rule, supra note 23, at 747-60. Managers
may not, however, force the senior classes to compensate them for such contribution. See
Norwest Bank Worthington v. Ahlers 485 U.S. 197 (1988), on remand, In re Ablers, 844 F.2d
587 (1988).
44. See, e.g., Bryan Doherty, Factors Toughen Stand on Campeau, WOMEN'S WEAR
DAILY, Jan. 17, 1990, at 1 (describing concerns of vendors to Federated and Allied department
stores immediately after these corporations filed Chapter 11 petitions).
45. Creditors relying on a security interest in a debtor's inventory and accounts receiv-
able normally require the obligors on the accounts to make payments to a "lock-box" or "blocked
account" under the control of the lender. This procedure is necessary to insure that the lender
retains a priority in the cash proceeds of the accounts. See D. Benjamin Beard, The Purchase
Money Security Interest in Inventory: If It Does Not Float, It Must Be Dead., 57 TtNN. L REV.
437, 471 n.170 (1990); JAMES J. CUNNINGHAM ET AL., STRUCTURING SECURED
COMMERCIAL LOAN DOCUMENTS § 6.05 (1991).
46. 11 U.S.C. § 363(c)(2) (1988) (debtor in possession may not use, sell, or lease
cash collateral unless the secured creditor consents or the court approves).
47. 11 U.S.C. § 364(a) (1988) (debtor in possession may obtain unsecured credit and
unsecured debt in the ordinary course of business).
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administrative priority for such extensions of credit.48 This authority takes
care of normal trade credit to the extent it remains available after the petition
is filed. If such trade credit is not forthcoming, however, the debtor must seek
financing from other, non-ordinary, sources.
The Code provides a scheme of credit enhancements in order to induce
lending. 49 Case law provides additional enhancements directed at the debtor's
existing secured creditors. 50 In the event an administrative priority is not
enough to convince a potential lender to make a loan to the debtor, the Code
allows the debtor to grant security to the potential lender.51 If financing is
unavailable on this basis, the existing secured lender may be willing to make a
loan or allow the use of cash collateral 52 in exchange for an enhancement of
its prepetition position through a device known as cross-collateralization. 53
Cross-collateralization allows a secured creditor to reduce or eliminate
prepetition collateral shortfalls by taking a security interest in property
acquired postpetition to secure both pre- and postpetition advances. Absent
such a provision, the interest securing a lender's prepetition claim will not
extend to property generated by business operations after the petition is filed. 54
Instead, the lender will share this postpetition property with non-subordinated
unsecured creditors on a pro-rata basis. 55 Thus, cross-collateralization can be
viewed as an incremental direct cost of financing because it reduces assets
available to the general unsecured creditors.56 Such costs in fact may be
48. Id. Debt or credit obtained in the ordinary course of business is an administrative
expense allowable under § 503(b)(1).
49. After notice and a hearing, the court may authorize the debtor in possession to incur
debt with a priority over other administrative expenses or secured by a lien on property of the
estate. See 11 U.S.C. § 364(c). If all else fails, 11 U.S.C. § 364(d) allows the court to autho-
rize a so-called "priming lien"- a lien senior to those of existing secured creditors - provided
that the existing secured creditors are adequately protected.
50. See infra text accompanying notes 53-58.
51. 11 U.S.C. § 364(c)(2) (The court may allow the debtor in possession to incur debt
secured by a lien on property of the estate.).
52. The debtor must obtain either the consent of the secured creditor or bankruptcy
court approval prior to using "cash collateral." 11 U.S.C. § 363(c)(2).
53. See, e.g., In re Vanguard Diversified, Inc., 31 B.R. 364, 366 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y.
1983); In re Roblin Indus., Inc., 52 B.R. 241, 244 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1985); In re FCX, Inc.,
54 B.R. 833, 840 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 1985). But see In re Monach Circuit Indus., Inc., 41
B.R. 859, 862 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1984) (cross-collateralization constitutes a preference under §
507(b) and is, therefore, impermissible); In re Tenney Village Co., 104 B.R. 562 (Bankr.
D.N.H. 1989) (financing agreement containing cross-collateralization provision violated
debtor's fiduciary obligations to estate).
Cross-collateralization is but one of several credit enhancements available to the debtor in
possession. Other such enhancements include cross-super-prioritization and waiver clauses.
See Charles J. Tabb, Emergency Preferential Orders in Bankruptcy Reorganizations, 65 AM.
BANKR. LJ. 75, 85-92 (1991) [hereinafter Emergency Preferential Orders].
54. 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(2)(B) (1988) (Property acquired after commencement of the
case is not subject to any lien created prior to the commencement of the case.).
55. 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) (1988) (A claim is secured to the extent of the value of such
creditor's interest in the estate's interest in such property and is unsecured to the extent that the
value of the creditor's interest is less than the amount of the claim.).
56. See JACKSON, supra note 35, at 168; Charles J. Tabb, A Critical Reappraisal of
Cross-Collateralization in Bankruptcy, 60 S. CAL. L. REv. 109, 169-74 (1986) [hereinafter
Cross-Collateralization]. For example, assume that a lender has a $100,000 claim secured by
accounts receivable worth $75,000 as of the petition date. The debtor requests that the lender
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justified if no other lender is willing to finance the debtor in possession on a
cheaper basis and if the value preserved from the operation of the business is
greater than such costs. 57
The decision to finance on this basis implicates both asset deployment
and financial restructuring issues. The need for financing implicitly assumes
both that it is more beneficial to keep the business assets together and operat-
ing than it is to liquidate those assets, and that the costs of financing are justi-
fied by the going concern value saved. The cost of financing under cross-
collateral terms changes the ultimate terms of the financial restructuring by
expanding the reach of the secured creditor's prepetition priority. By expand-
ing the assets in which the secured creditor may claim priority under the abso-
lute priority rule, the term may provide a significant increase in the secured
creditor's leverage in the plan process. 58
2. Executory Contracts
A contract is deemed to be executory under the Code when some per-
formance is due on both sides of the transaction.59 Professor Douglas Baird
and Dean Thomas Jackson have aptly described executory contracts as an
asset coupled with a liability - the asset being the performance due the
debtor and the liability being the obligation owed by the debtor.60 Since
bankruptcy law views assets as carrying with them all of their restrictions and
liabilities,6' the Code's handling of these special creatures follows neatly. The
Code allows the debtor in possession to assume the contract or to reject the
contract. 62 If the debtor chooses to assume the contract, the debtor must take
with it all of the burdens of that assumption - namely the requirement of full
provide $50,000 of postpetition financing and offers the lender a lien on accounts acquired by
the debtor postpetition that are anticipated to have a value of $75,000 by the end of the case. To
the extent that the lender insists upon, and the debtor agrees to, cross-collateralization, the post-
etition accounts will be pledged to secure both the $50,000 postpetition advance and the
100,000 prepetition obligation. Thus, the lender will, through cross-collateralization, convert
its prepetition obligation from an undersecured claim to a fully secured claim. This conversion
results in financing costs borne by the unsecured creditors who otherwise would have been enti-
tled to satisfy their claims out of the postpetition accounts on a pro-rata basis with the secured
creditor.
57. See JACKSON, supra note 35, at 168.
58. Cross-collateralization is a species of the broader issue of whether any claimant
should be allowed to receive payment of its prepetition claim in return for necessary postpetition
goods and services. The "doctrine of becessity" was developed in railroad reorganizations as a
means of allowing the bankrupt railroad to obtain needed supplies from creditors who insisted
on payment of their claims as a prerequisite to continuing to do business with the debtor. See
generally Emergency Preferential Orders, supra note 53; Russell A. Eisenberg & Frances.F.
Gecker, The Doctrine of Necessity and Its Parameters, 73 MARQ. L. REV. 1 (1989). These
payments operate in the same manner as cross-collateralization in that they use estate assets to
change pre-bankruptcy priorities.
59. Professor Countryman has developed what has since become the traditional defini-
tion of an executory contract: "[A] contract under which the obligation of both the bankrupt and
the other party to the contract are so far unperformed that the failure of either to complete per-
formance would constitute a material breach excusing the performance of the other." Vern
Countryman, Executory Contracts in Bankruptcy: Part 1, 57 MINN. L. REV. 439,460 (1972).
60. DOUGLAS G. BAIRD & THOMAS H. JACKSON, CASES, PROBLEMS, AND
MATERIALS ON BANKRUPTCY 234 (2d ed. 1990).
61. Id. at 217-18. See also Board of Trade v. Johnson, 264 U.S. 1 (1924).
62. 11 U.S.C. § 365(a) (1988).
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performance of all of the debtor's obligations under the contract.63 If the
debtor rejects the benefit under the contract, the contract is simply treated as
having been breached by the debtor and the damages occasioned by that
breach are treated as would any other prepetition claim. 64
The decision to accept or reject an executory contract raises an asset
deployment issue. For instance, assume that a debtor wishes to continue a
line of business that requires an exclusive trademark license. If the license is
already held by the debtor as a right under an executory contract, the debtor
may continue to use the right through assumption of the contract and payment
of all outstanding obligations owed under the contract. The business issue
presented is whether to use estate assets in order to continue as licensee.
This decision is no different from the initial decision to purchase the license. 65
The decisionmaker must weigh the purchase price - payment of the prepeti-
tion obligation - against the expected benefit provided by the license. This
decision also impacts the financial restructuring question by removing the non-
bankrupt party from the restructuring negotiations through payment in full.
3. Asset Sales
One of the most fundamental questions that participants in a Chapter 11
reorganization may face is whether significant business assets should be sold
outside of the plan process.66 The need to sell assets prior to the completion
and approval of a plan arises from the fact that the plan process has nothing to
do with the process of marketing assets. Plan negotiations are messy and
relatively protracted affairs. Alliances among owners and views over the
appropriate disposition of corporate assets may change frequently. Most of
the problems addressed by the process do not concern the prospective buyer
of assets who simply wishes to close the purchase with a minimum of trans-
action costs. Thus, owners of companies undergoing a Chapter 11 reorgani-
zation often have found it useful to sell assets before the conclusion of the
Chapter 11 process. The Code recognizes this business reality and provides
authority for these transactions. 67
63. Id. § 365(b)(1).
64. Id. § 365(g).
65. Tbis discussion assumes that the contract rights owned by the debtor are useful in
the business operations. The Code also provides that the debtor in possession may assume
favorable executory contracts and assign them to third parties. Id. § 365(0. When the debtor in
possession wishes to assign contractual rights in this manner, the cost-benefit issues surround-
ing the assumption are normally simplified. Costs can be determined by looking to the debtor's
obligations and benefits can be determined by looking to the consideration the third party is to
pay to the estate. The only question remaining is whether the estate is better off with the cash
than with the contractual rights - an asset sale question. See infra text accompanying notes 66-
69 for an analysis of asset sale questions.
66. This issue has arisen in several large reorganizations. See, e.g., In re Continental
Air Lines, Inc., 780 F.2d 1223 (5th Cir. 1986) (ability of debtor to enter into long-term, post-
petition leases of property of the estate); In re Braniff Airways, Inc., 700 F.2d 935 (5th Cir.
1983), reh'g denied, 705 F.2d 450 (5th Cir. 1983) (sale by debtor of all of its assets); In re
Lionel Corp., 722 F.2d 1063 (2d Cir. 1983) (sale of 82% of debtor's common stock holdings in
another corporation).
67. 11 U.S.C. § 363(b)(1) (after notice and a hearing, the trustee may use, sell or lease
property outside of the ordinary course of business).
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The effect of such sales on the asset deployment question is obvious.
The pre-plan sale of a significant asset is the deployment decision. If the
company decides to sell assets, this decision should be reached because the
business is better off with the cash than with the particular assets. The sale
also affects the financial restructuring issue because it removes the asset from
the debate over business value.68 The sale normally converts the property
sold, the value of which may be debatable, into cash, the value of which can-
not be contested.69 Thus, to a certain extent, the negotiations over the
appropriate division of business values will be simplified by the sale.
Financing, executory contracts, and asset sales all share a common
theme. They are all fundamental business decisions that directly impact the
basic problems Chapter 11 is designed to address; however, given the need to
efficiently operate the business during the plan process, these issues may often
be decided without a full negotiation process culminating in a vote by inter-
ested parties. The plan negotiation mechanism is normally unavailable or
unsuitable to respond to these issues because of its length and fractious
nature. Full participation of claimants must give way to pragmatism in the
interest of preserving some value to which their claims may attach.
This practical concern gives rise to a need to control the group that
makes or initiates these decisions. Since those economically interested in
these significant decisions may not fully participate in the decisionmaking pro-
cess, some mechanism must be available to insure that the decisionmaker acts
in the interests of the group affected by the decisions. This problem is exactly
what governance systems are designed to resolve. The key is designing a
governance structure that aligns the incentives of the representatives with
those of the represented.
I. NON-BANKRUPTCY CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
PRINCIPLES
Of course, governance problems are not unique to Chapter 11.
Corporate owners face the same problems of incentive alignment outside of
Chapter 11 as they do within the process. The non-bankruptcy corporate
governance system consists of a web of contract, market, and legal devices
that together provide an integrated framew6rk for the resolution of conflicts
among corporate actors. A few general notions are commonplace. If a cor-
poration is solvent,70 its management operates the business on behalf of the
shareholders. Shareholders hold ultimate decisionmaking authority through
68. The sale of an asset in which a creditor has a security interest more directly affects
the financial restructuring question. 11 U.S.C. § 363(f) provides that assets may be sold free
and clear of liens if the secured creditor is given the proceeds of the sale or if the secured credi-
tor's lien continues in the proceeds. See H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 220(1977). Thus, a sale of an asset that serves as collateral removes the secured creditor from the
negotiations to the extent of the value of that asset.
69. Of course, if the sale were made for noncash consideration, a note for example, the
debate over value would continue. The focus of the valuation simply would shift to the pro-
ceeds.
70. "Solvency" is used herein to refer to the value of the corporation's assets as com-
pared to the amount of its liabilities. Thus, a corporation is "solvent" when the value of its
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their ability to change the composition of the corporation's board of directors.
The creditors' place in the governance system is primarily derived from con-
tractual protections.
As the corporation begins the slide toward insolvency and failure, credi-
tors' contractual protections begin to operate as control devices, allowing
creditors to exercise more of the decisionmaking authority previously left to
shareholders. This section looks at these general principles in the context of
solvent corporations and corporations experiencing financial distress in an
attempt to develop a framework under which the bankruptcy governance
system may be analyzed.
A. Governance in the Solvent Corporation
Economic theory views the corporation7l as the central party to a set of
contracts under which factors of production are combined. 72 Owners of labor,
raw materials, and capital each contract with the corporation rather than with
each other,73 thus reducing overall transaction costs and encouraging
"cooperative specialization" 74 of input owners. Each individual contracting
party makes initial decisions based upon the party's view of the proffered
contract terms. The process of bargaining provides decisionmaking authority
to those most affected by the decisions; and, if not for the high costs associ-
ated with contracting, parties likely would prefer the contractual model to any
representational decisionmaking system.
Governance, then, is a decisionmaking structure necessitated by the
inefficiencies associated with contracting for all contingencies. Because bar-
gaining is costly, some group must hold discretion over the decisions that fall
between the gaps of contract. Corporate statutes vest this discretion in the
corporation's board of directors, and the board further delegates much of its
authority to the corporation's officers. 75 The board and officers, herein col-
lectively referred to as the "management," thus have the discretion to make
business decisions and are charged with monitoring the actions of all of the
contracting parties to insure that they are fulfilling their bargains.
The analysis cannot end here, however. Management itself must be
controlled lest it fail to uphold its responsibility to operate the business in an
assets exceeds the amount of its liabilities and is "insolvent" when its liabilities exceed the value
of its assets. See 11 U.S.C. § 101(29) (1988).
71. Economic analysis uses the broader concept of the "firm." Michael C. Jensen &
William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and
Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 306 (1976). Corporations are one type of firm.
Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, and Economic
Organization, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 777, 787 (1972).
72. Jensen & Meckling, supra note 71, at 308; Eugene F. Fama & Michael C. Jensen,
Separation of Ownership and Control, 26 J.L. & ECON. 301, 302 (1983) [hereinafter
Separation of Ownership and Control].
73. The alternative method of organization is through markets. See Alchian &
Demsetz, supra note 71, at 777.
74. Id.
75. DEL. GEN. CORP. LAW § 141 (1991); REV. MODEL Bus. CORP. ACr §§ 8.01,




efficient manner. To whom is management accountable? The answer to this
question yields the true locus of discretionary authority - the shareholders of
the business.
1. Shareholders and Managers: The Importance of Residual Claims
It is widely assumed that shareholders, as opposed to creditors, employ-
ees, suppliers, or the state, hold ultimate control over the management of the
business and, thus, over discretionary decisions affecting the corporation. 76
The shareholders elect the corporation's board of directors77 which, along with
the corporation's officers, owes a duty of loyalty and a duty of care to the
shareholders. 78 Other parties are simply protected by specific contractual or
legal rules.
This division of authority can be explained by an examination of the
nature of the shareholders' contract with the company. Because shareholders
hold claims to residual earnings of the company, they hold the correct set of
economic incentives to monitor management to ensure that it makes decisions
that will maximize the value of the assets of the business. 79 The nature of
residual claims is such that the group holding such claims is the primary bene-
ficiary of successful business operations and bears most of the risk of poor
performance. No other group holds such incentives. 80
Shareholders in public corporations cannot, and do not want to, make all
of the decisions falling between the gaps of contract, however.81 The high
76. This assumption is not self-explanatory. See Oliver Williamson, Corporate
Governance, 93 YALE L.J. 1197 (1984); Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Voting in
Corporate Law, 26 J.L. & ECON. 395, 403 (1983) [hereinafter Voting]. Although it is clear
that someone needs to retain final discretionary authority, it is not as clear that this group should
or must be the shareholders. See, e.g., DEL. GEN. CORP. LAW § 221 (1991) (every corpora-
tion, in its certificate of incorporation, may give its creditors the power to vote).
77. DEL. GEN. CORP. LAW § 211 (1991); REV. MODEL Bus. CORP. ACr §§ 8.03,
8.04 (1991).
78. DEL. GEN. CORP. LAW § 144 (1991); REV. MODEL Bus. CORP. ACr § 8.42
(1991). But see, Morey W. McDaniel, Bondholders and Stockholders, 13 J. CORP. L. 205,
265-73 (1988) (arguing that creditors should be owed such duties).
79. See Voting, supra note 76, at 403; Alchian & Demsetz, supra note 71, at 782.
80.
As the residual claimants, the shareholders are the group with the appropriate
incentives (collective choice problems to one side) to make discretionary deci-
sions. The firm should invest in new products, plants, etc., until the gains and
costs are identical at the margin. Yet all of the actors, except the shareholders,
lack the appropriate incentives. Those with fixed claims on the income stream
may receive only a tiny benefit (in increased security) from the undertaking of a
new project. The shareholders receive most of the marginal gains and incur most
of the marginal costs. They therefore have the right incentives to exercise discre-
tion.
Voting, supra note 76, at 403.
Williamson, supra note 76, at 1210, also points out that because a shareholder's rela-
tionship with the firm does not come up for periodic renewal and because a shareholder's
investments are not associated with specific assets, a shareholder is unable to protect him or her-
self by specific contracting in the way that creditors can. See infra text accompanying notes Ill-
24 for a description of creditor protections.
81. Corporate democracy must of necessity be representational. See-Frank H.
Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Corporate Control Transactions, 91 YALE LJ. 698, 700
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information costs in the complex corporate enterprise coupled with the small
stake of each individual shareholder limit corporate democracy to a represen-
tational system. 2 With ownership spread among many investors, each indi-
vidual investor may be unwilling to expend the time and money necessary to
obtain information appropriate to the decisionmaking process.83 Some dele-
gation of authority is therefore necessary.
Most of the shareholders' decisionmaking authority is vested in the
board of directors through the articles of incorporation and state corporation
codes.94 Discretion over several significant issues is, however, retained by the
shareholders.85 The reasoning behind this retention of control is again related
to the fact that shareholders,86 as residual claimants, have the most to gain or
lose by these decisions.87
This delegation of authority requires a system to regulate the relation-
ship between managers and shareholders. 88 The traditional conception of the
relationship is that of fiduciary-beneficiary. Management is considered to hold
(1982) [hereinafter Corporate Control Transactions]. Portfolio theory provides that investors
may reduce their potential losses by investing in many different companies. See John C. Coffee,
Jr., Shareholders Versus Managers: The Strain in the Corporate Web, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1,
17-20 (1986); Eugene F. Fama & Michael C. Jensen, Agency Problems and Residual Claims,
26 J.L. & ECON. 327, 329 (1983) [hereinafter Agency Problems] ("Common stock allows
residual risk to be spread across many residual claimants who individually choose the extent to
which they bear risk and who can diversify across organizations offering such claims.").
The ability of investors to diversify also lowers the cost of capital to the corporation. See
Alchian & Demsetz, supra note 71, at 787 ("For the most part, capital can be acquired more
cheaply if many (risk-averse) investors contribute small portions to a large investment."). Thus,
the desire for diversification creates a separation of ownership and control. See Fama, supra
note 81, at 290; Corporate Control Transactions, supra note 81, at 701.
82. See Separation of Ownership and Control, supra note 72, at 306.
83. See Voting, supra note 76, at 397. Furthermore, significant free-rider problems
may cause even individual investors with a high incentive to become informed to fail to obtain
the necessary information. Saul Levmore, Monitors and Freeriders in Commercial and
Corporate Settings, 92 YALE L. 49, 60 (1982).
84. Some commentators view these state corporation codes as simply a "standard form
contract" providing "off the rack" rules in order to reduce bargaining costs. Voting, supra note
76, at 401.
85. Shareholders retain discretion over fundamental changes in the corporation, such as
mergers (DEL. GEN. CORP. LAW § 251 (1991); REv. MODEL Bus. CORP. ACr § 11:01(1991)), the sale of substantially all of the assets of the corporation (DEL. GEN. CORP. LAW §
271 (1991); REV. MODEL Bus. CORP. Acr §§ 12.01, 12.02 (1991)), and changes to the arti-
cles (DEL. GEN. CORP. LAW § 109 (1991); REV. MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 10.03 (1991)).
86. Decisions over fundamental changes in the corporation also may affect creditors
and other suppliers of inputs to the corporation. These parties ultimately may have a "vote" on
these fundamental changes through their own contracts with the corporation. Covenants against
such changes will require the corporation's management to obtain these parties' consent - their
"vote."
87. See Voting, supra note 76, at 403. Another reason for the requirement of a share-
holder vote on changes to the articles of incorporation is that the articles constitute the fundamen-
tal contract between the management and the shareholders. As such, shareholders should be
entitled to vote on modifications to this document.
88. As the foregoing discussion indicates, the primary focus of corporate governance
law is on the relationship between manager and shareholder as opposed to creditors. Creditors,
however, also fit into the framework of governance because at some level corporate decision-




its powers in trust for the shareholders.8 9 This conceptualization of the
relationship leads to a governance structure that centers on the duties of
loyalty and care 90 that management owes to shareholders.
The problem with the fiduciary model of corporate governance is that it
does not adequately explain the true dynamics of the manager-shareholder
relationship. As with any relationship involving the delegation of authority, the
corporate governance system must address two general problem areas. First,
the system must control actions by the management that involve a direct con-
flict of interest. Shareholders must be assured that management will act with-
out the taint of self-dealing if delegation is to be encouraged. Second, the
system of governance must insure that management will act with diligence
and care. This latter problem implicates more subtle conflicts which may be
present but cannot be discerned by judicial authority and that, therefore, must
be controlled by contractual incentives and market forces.
A view of corporate governance that focuses on fiduciary duties works
relatively well to explain sanctions against obvious managerial misconduct.
The duty of loyalty imposes a high standard of judicial review of management
decisions involving some direct conflict of interest.91 The standard applies,
however, only in situations in which a clear conflict is present. When the
conflicts are not as clear, judicial abstention is the rule.92
Managerial decisions and performance outside of the realm of direct
conflict are reviewed only under the business judgment rule.93 The rule
reflects an attitude of abstention by presuming that management's actions
were fully informed and in good faith believed to be in the best interests of the
company.94 In abstaining from review of the quality of decisions, courts likely
are recognizing the limitations of judicial fact-finding.95 Conflicts of interest
may be present in many corporate decisionmaking settings; but the conflict
may be so subtle that a court cannot accurately determine whether
management was motivated in its actions by its own interest or the best inter-
est of the company.
Something more than a simple fiduciary-beneficiary model is necessary
to explain the resolution of these subtle conflicts within the manager-share-
holder relationship. The neoclassical economic analysis of the firm provides a
more inclusive theory. This analysis views shareholders and managers as
principals and agents, respectively.96 The principal-agent relationship is
89. See Louisiana World Exposition v. Federal Ins. Co., 858 F.2d 233, 250 (5th Cir.
1988); ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND
PRIVATE PROPERTY 247-76 (1948).
90. See ROBERT C. CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 93-141 (1986).
91. See Alan R. Palmiter, Reshaping the Corporate Fiduciary Model: A Director's
Duty ofindependence, 67 TEX. L. REV. 1351, 1364-65 (1989).
92. Id. at 1358-59; Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Proper Role of a
Target's Management in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1161, 1195-97(1981) [hereinafter Responding to a Tender Offer].
93. Palmiter, supra note 91, at 1358.
94. See CLARK, supra note 90, at 123-24.
95. Responding to a Tender Offer, supra note 92, at 1196.
96. Jensen & Meckling, supra note 71, at 308-09; Agency Problems, supra note 81, at
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governed primarily by contract - with fiduciary duties as gap-filling rules.97
Seen in this light, fiduciary duties are merely a component of a broader con-
tractual framework regulating the relationship98 rather than an all-encom-
passing solution to the problems created by the delegation of authority.
The neoclassical analysis starts with the proposition that the interests of
managers and shareholders in a public corporation are potentially in conflict.
Managers, as utility-maximizing individuals, may have an incentive to shirk,
thus giving rise to agency costs including the costs of monitoring managerial
behavior and inefficiencies resulting from restraints on management discre-
tion.99
Management shirking goes beyond the problem of inattention to the
business operations. The problem also extends to attitudes toward risk. 00 In
a solvent corporation, management is likely to be more risk averse than are
the shareholders. Assuming that the investors in the business hold diversified
portfolios of investments, most of the enterprise risk of failure of a particular
corporation within the portfolio may be diversified away, leaving shareholders
with little risk aversion. 101 Management, on the other hand, has a high level of
firm-specific skills invested in the business and is, therefore, unable to
diversify.102 Thus, management likely will avoid decisions that will increase
the risk of failure of the corporation but are desired by the shareholders.
The fiduciary principle cannot adequately regulate this type of conflict.
Allowing a court to review all management decisions under a strict standard
would create an explosion of litigation in which courts would be called upon to
make fine judgments regarding the appropriate level of risk the business
should be allowed to assume. Abstention is necessary.103
Thus, the system requires other controls against shirking. One method
of control is through contract. Shareholders retain the ability to displace man-
agement through the periodic election of the board of directors. 0 4 Restraints
97. This Article expresses no view as to whether these duties, like other contractual
duties, ought to be susceptible to waiver by the parties.
98. 'l'ie structural rules and the fiduciary principle together cover only the outlines of
the relations among corporate actors." Voting, supra note 76, at 401-02.
99. See Jensen & Meckling, supra note 71, at 308-10. The reduction of these costs is
the central goal of the corporate governance framework. Responding to a Tender Offer, supra
note 92, at 1169-74; Agency Problems, supra note 81, at 327-28.
100. Coffee, supra note 81, at 17-20.
101. See supra note 81.
102. Coffee, supra note 81, at 19-20.
103.
Fiduciary regulation (like any other regulation) can also impose costs greater than
the agency costs it saves. Agency costs already constrained by internal gover-
nance structures and market forces may not require further fiduciary regulation,
particularly if that regulation (largely enforced through derivative litigation)
would create additional costs of its own. Judicial abstention under the care
regime is justified to the extent that these constraints operate effectively. Only
when they insufficiently constrain agency costs, such as when self dealing
occurs, is judicial intervention demanded.
Palmiter, supra note 91, at 1371. See also Responding to Tender Offers, supra note 92, at
1196.
104. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
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provided,by the market work alongside the contractual controls. Managers
who fail to maximize the value of the corporation's shares may find
themselves displaced in a hostile takeover. 105 These controls along with
fiduciary duties provide an integrated system of governance. Each aspect of
the structure complements the others, and all are necessary to provide a
complete system.
Consider first the contractual controls. Standing alone, the ability of
individual shareholders to elect directors is relatively meaningless in the large
modern corporation. As Adolph Berle and Gardiner Means pointed out over
forty years ago, management controls the machinery of election. 106 The proxy
machinery is necessary to solve the collective action problems caused by
widely dispersed ownership; but since managers control the proxy machinery,
they control the outcome of the election.' °7
If the problem is dispersion of votes, the remedy is aggregation of voting
power. This is the role of the market. The shareholders' ability to exit the
firm by selling their shares creates a concomitant ability to aggregate power
through the purchase of shares. If managers shirk, disgruntled shareholders
are likely to sell - driving down the price of the shares to a level at which
aggregation by a "raider" becomes attractive.1 08 Once shares are aggregated,
the raider may use the contractual rights accompanying the shares to displace
current management.109
Fiduciary principles can do nothing more than fill in the gaps by provid-
ing sanctions against management actions which are not likely to be ade-
quately restrained by market and contractual controls. Markets may react to
105. See generally LoUIs LOWENSTEIN, WHAT'S WRONG WITH WALL STREEr 119-59
(1988); Responding to Tender Offers, supra note 92, at 1169-73; Alchian & Demsetz, supra
note 72, at 788; Richard E. Cook, What the Economics Literature has to Say about Takeovers,
in PUBLIC POLICY TOWARD CORPORATE TAKEOVERS (Murray L. Weidenbaum & Kenneth W.
Chilton eds., 1988).
106. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 89, at 207-19. Individuals holding stock that is
widely dispersed have no real ability acting alone to effect changes. Responding to Tender
Offers, supra note 92, at 1169-71; Lucian A. Bebchuk & Marcel Kahan, A Framework For
Analyzing Legal Policy Towards Proxy Contests, 78 CAL. L. REV. 1071, 1079-82 (1990).
Also, as pointed out above, shareholders are likely to be rationally indifferent to changes in man-
agement because their individual stake in the corporation is relatively small as compared to the
costs of organizing all of the shareholders into a cohesive group with enough clout to displace
managers. See supra text accompanying notes 81-83.
107. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 89, at 207-19. Proxy contests seem to be staging a
comeback as a means of displacing managers. See Bebchuk & Kahan, supra note 106, at 1075;
Judith H. Dobrzynski, Shareholders Unfurl Their Banner: Don't Tread on Us, BUSINESS
WEEK, June 11, 1990, at 66 (In 1990, "[m]ore investor groups were waging more proxy fights
for outright corporate control or for board representation than ever before."). The proxy rules
still, however, make it difficult for shareholders to utilize this mechanism effectively without
significant vote aggregation. See Bebchuk & Kahan, supra note 106, at 1082.
108. Management shirking gives rise to agency costs that can be reduced by an out-
sider's purchase of a control block and improvement of management. See Responding to
Tender Offers, supra note 92, at 1173.
109. Id. See also Alchian & Demsetz, supra note 71, at 788.
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diversions of assets and to interested transactions, but this reaction may be
inadequate to dissuade management from such misbehavior. 110
2. Creditors and Shareholders: Owners in Conflict
So far the analysis has focused on the relationship between the share-
holders and managers. Creditors,"'1 as contributors of "sunk" capital,112 also
may be concerned with managerial shirking and misappropriation. Unless
such actions threaten the solvency of the corporation, however, shareholders
may have better incentives to control these problems. Of more immediate
concern to creditors are transactions that benefit the shareholders by increas-
ing the risk of the enterprise after the creditors' capital is committed.
The relationship between corporate shareholders and creditors is inher-
ently characterized by conflict. The competing claims on the corporate
income stream result in differing and conflicting incentives.113 After the
interest rate of the debt is set, shareholders may have an incentive to increase
the risk of the enterprise and bondholders will wish to see the risk of the
enterprise decreased.114
The conflict can be described in terms of the phenomena of "other
people's money." Bondholders are compensated for their contribution of capi-
tal to the corporation through an interest rate that takes into account the risk
of nonpayment. This risk, in turn, is directly tied to the overall risk of failure of
the corporation. Once this rate is fixed, shareholders will opt for increased
risk since the potential gains are captured by them, while losses are shared
with the creditors. Unless creditors are able either to control such behavior or
110. See Responding to Tender Offers, supra note 92, at 1197. The reaction also
assumes that information regarding this type of misbehavior will be available. Indeed, the
nondisclosure of information regarding conflicts may result in strict liability for the actions with-
out any analysis of the fairness of the transaction. See Palmiter, supra note 91, at 1369-70.
111. An analysis focusing on the investor as the party interested in corporate governance
is probably still too narrow. Employees, customers, and others dependent on the corporation
are vitally interested from their own perspectives about the operations of the business. The
voices of these individuals, however, typically have not been the direct focus of the corporate
governance system. Instead, these interests have been protected through contract and through
the web of regulation and liability systems that are directed toward the specific problems of these
groups. Consumers are protected by federal and state consumer and safety regulation and
through the product liability system. Employees are protected by labor laws and union con-
tracts. Of course, this scheme has its detractors, but the goal here is to describe the system and
its operation in bankruptcy rather than to analyze fully the effect of the system on these disparate
groups. As to the effect of these other interests in bankruptcy, see infra text accompanying
notes 279-86.
112. The focus here is on long-term financing arrangements provided by corporate
bonds. Shorter term trade creditors and commercial paper holders are less prone to the effects of
stockholder manipulations because the capital obtained through these means must be continually
replaced.
113. See McDaniel, supra note 78, at 220-24.
114. Id. at 225-30. Commentators have identified three areas in which the conflict
manifests: dividend payments that decrease the amount of assets available to satisfy creditor
claims; claim dilution by issuing new debt at an equal or higher priority; and asset substitution
from lower to higher risk investments. Each of these actions results in increasing the risk of




fully take account of the possibility of such behavior in setting the interest rate,
shareholders may effect wealth transfers by increasing risk.115
While the corporation is solvent, the regulation of the creditor-share-
holder relationship may. be characterized as protective rather than managerial.
Shareholders, as the residual claimants of the business, are primarily con-
cerned with management's failure to maximize the asset values of the corpo-
ration. Creditors' concerns with managerial performance are limited to con-
straining behavior that increases the risk of the business enterprise. Thus,
while shareholders retain broad rights to replace management through the
mechanisms described above, creditors' concerns are addressed primarily by
contractual provisions limiting specific types of behavior,11 6 deemed at the
contracting stage to increase enterprise risk beyond that for which the credi-
tors have been compensated.117
Creditors may have an-ally in management. Because managers are so
heavily invested in the- enterprise, they may be resistant to shareholder
demands for increased risk.,18 Managers may be most secure in a corporation
capitalized largely with equity because of the lack of fixed obligations, the
greater likelihood of shareholder dispersion, and the increased total capital
required to wage a takeover battle. Thus the effectiveness of shareholder
controls may inversely impact the need for creditor protection.
B. The Slide Toward Insolvency
As the corporation approaches insolvency, shareholder-creditor con-
flicts become more pronounced. Shareholders put less and less capital at risk
in each new business decision as the value of the corporation declines. Thus,
shareholders' appetite for risk in the use of assets can be expected to
increase.
In response to this increased conflict, the regulatory aspects of the
credit relationship begin to change as the corporation encounters financial dif
115. See McDaniel, supra note 78 at 238-45.
116. In loan transactions the author has participated in, covenants include limitations on
asset sales, new debt and liens, and the maintenance of certain levels of financial performance
indicators such as net worth, debt coverage ratios, and working capital. The sanction for breach
is acceleration - a withdrawal of capital from the organization. Thus, the effectiveness of the
bond contract as a control over management discretion lies in the ability of the corporation to
replace the capital through the market.
117. Bondholders, unlike shareholders, hold fixed priority claims against the income
stream generated by the assets. When a corporation is truly solvent, bondholders are by defimi-
tion assured full payment of their claims assuming nothing changes. Obviously, things do
change over the life of a bondholder's relationihip with the firm and, therefore, bondholders
must be compensated for the risk that such changes ultimately may result in insolvency and cor-
responding losses to the bondholders. The amount of compensation required by bondholders is
limited by the amount of risk assumed. Thus, as the covenants become stricter, the rate of com-
pensation should decrease.
118. SeeCoffee, supranote8l, at 17-19.
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ficulties. As the cash flowl19 and asset values 120 of the business weaken,
creditors begin to take a more activist approach to governance issues. No
longer will creditors be content to sit on the sidelines satisfied with their pro-
tections against specific actions. Thus, creditors begin to replace shareholders
as the focal point in the governance system.
The governance system remains primarily contractual during this stage.
Once business difficulties' have reached a contractually determined level, the
corporation will find itself in default of covenants that previously protected the
creditors. These defaults provide creditors the right to withdraw capital from
the enterprise.
The right to withdraw capital provides creditors with leverage needed to
make the transition from a protective to a participatory relationship. The
managers, hoping to avoid such withdrawal, may seek a waiver of the right,
giving the creditors an opportunity to seek a more extensive role in corporate
decisionmaking. For example, creditors may insist on asset sales to repay
debt, additional capital infusions from sources outside of the corporation,
restrictions on new debt, or replacement of key management personnel. If the
financial crisis passes through a successfully completed workout, creditors
may resume their protective relationship under revised contract terms.
As the corporation nears insolvency, legal restraints become effective to
complement the market and contractual forces governing the relationship.
Dividend restriction121 and fraudulent conveyance 122 laws become applicable
to remedy diversions of capital from the corporation. Preference laws 123
remedy the imbalance in debt payments made during the final days before
bankruptcy. Finally, management's fiduciary duties of care and loyalty are
extended to creditors along with shareholders. 24 These legal restraints
119. Cash flow must be distinguished from the accounting concept of earnings.
"[L]everaged companies [and their lenders] think of cash flow rather than earnings." Carol J.
Loomis, The Biggest Looniest Deal Ever, FORTUNE, June 18, 1990, at 50. Cash flow is the
actual cash generated by the business operations after taking into account payments to suppliers,
laborers, landlords, and other input owners. It is this cash, less amounts necessary for capital
expenditures, that is available for debt service.
120. Creditors are also concerned about asset values because these values provide a base
level of protection in a worst case scenario. Upon liquidation of the corporation, creditors will
be forced to seek payment of their claims from the assets themselves rather than cash flow.
121. See, e.g., REV. MODEL Bus. CORP. Acr § 6.40 (1991); DEL. GEN. CORP. LAW
§ 170 (1991). Dividend restriction statutes are intended to insure that some level of capital
remains available for the satisfaction of creditor claims by restricting the ability of shareholders
to withdraw capital when the corporation is at or near insolvency. Commentators are somewhat
skeptical about the effectiveness of these statutes, however. See CLARK, supra note 90, at 610-
24.
122. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 548 (1988); UNIF. FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT, 7A
U.L.A. 639 (1985); UNIF. FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES ACT, 7A U.L.A. 427 (1985).
Fraudulent conveyance laws address both transfers intended to hinder, delay, or defraud credi-
tors and transfers for less than reasonably equivalent value (such as dividends) made when the
corporation is insolvent or is rendered insolvent by the transfer.
123. See 11 U.S.C. § 547 (1988). Preference laws require the return of certain pay-
ments made to creditors immediately prior to bankruptcy to provide some assurance that simi-
larly situated creditors are treated equally.
124. See Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 310-11 (1939). See also William Bratton,
Jr., The Economics and Jurisprudence of Convertible Bonds, 1984 WIs. L. REV. 667, 734
n.247; Stephen H. Case, Fiduciary Duties of Corporate Directors and Officers, Resolution of
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operate in the same manner as fiduciary duties to shareholders operate out-
side of insolvency. They fill in the gaps of the contract-market controls over
the relationship.
C. Insolvency and Crisis: A Possible Governance Structure.
At the bottom of the slide awaits crisis. Once a corporation has actually
become insolvent, it is clear that the ownership structure must change. The
most obvious method of change is to liquidate the business assets and to pay
the proceeds to the owners in exchange for their ownership interests.
Avoiding liquidation requires some type of reorganization under either
bankruptcy or non-bankruptcy law. The reorganization process allows for
creative solutions to this problem by providing a means by which the parties
can renegotiate most of the contracts constituting the corporation. At the
same time, the process raises significantly more governance problems than a
simple liquidation because the preservation of the business usually necessi-
tates a continuation of operations.
The corporate governance structure as it exists in solvent and failing
corporations suggests an approach to governance of insolvent corporations.
This approach places the creditors in the role of the group entitled to hold the
residual authority over business decisions. The rationale for placing equity
holders in a position of primacy in the governance framework of solvent cor-
porations is that as the residual claimants, shareholders have a direct financial
interest in marginal business decisions and are therefore in the best position to
monitor management to ensure that it maximizes the value of the corporation's
assets. Once a corporation is insolvent, creditors occupy this position and
therefore should be cast in this monitoring role.125
From this premise one could envision an idealized reorganization pro-
cess. After finding the locus of decisionmaking authority by identifying the
group holding the residual claims, delegation and regulation principles could be
applied in a manner similar to that existing outside of bankruptcy. The residual
decisionmaking body could be trusted to make asset deployment decisions
within the confines of the preexisting contractual limitations held by senior
creditors since these residual claimants would have the appropriate incentives
to maximize the corporation's asset value. 126
Conflicts Between Creditors and Shareholders, and Removal of Directors by Dissident
Shareholders in Chapter 11 Cases, WILLIAMSBURG CONFERENCE ON BANKRUPTCY 391
(ALI-ABA Invitational Conference 1988). But see McDaniel, supra note 78, at 267-68
(managers should act as fiduciaries of creditors as well as shareholders without regard to the
solvency of the corporation).
125. "Once it becomes clear that there will not be enough to pay the creditors in full,
continuing the decisionmaking authority in the hands of the shareholders and their agents effec-
tively separates the decisionmaker from the group that stands to gain or lose as a consequence of
the decision." JACKSON, supra note 35, at 167.
126. Unsecured creditors (assuming that they truly hold the residual claims) could exer-
cise control over the composition of management through voting and vote aggregation proce-
dures. Creditors who are senior in priority to the unsecured claimants could rely on protective
devices imposed through bankruptcy procedures. Because equity claimants are no longer eco-
nomically interested in the business by virtue of their previous ownership interests, they would
be forced to bargain with the corporation on the basis of any values they could bring to the busi-
ness in the future. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
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This analysis is deceptive in its simplicity. Although allowing the resid-
ual claimants to exercise control over the process should result in rational
decisionmaking, the method can only work if one can readily identify this
group. Such identification is no easy matter. The question calls for complex
determinations of both asset values and the amount of liabilities that are the
core problems of the reorganization process itself. If one could readily assess
amounts of assets and liabilities, the entire bankruptcy process would be
extremely simple. Suffice it to say that the process is not easy. 127
One cannot simply ignore this difficulty and assume that a particular
group of owners is well suited for the residual decisionmaking role. Because
insolvency so often results in a crisis atmosphere in relations among the own-
ers, economic incentives may clash as never before. Shareholders of the
insolvent corporation will have an incentive to delay any final determination of
asset values while increasing enterprise risk in the hopes of receiving some
continuing interest in ihe corporation.12 8 Creditors with a priority that ensures
full payment of claims may nonetheless seek to withdraw from the failing
entity.129 The group holding the correct set of incentives will fall somewhere
in-between. This group will realize any going concern value preserved by a
reorganization and will fully bear the costs of reorganization and the risk of
loss if the reorganization fails.1 3o
Given the difficulties of the valuation process, the idealized reorganiza-
tion will probably never be a reality. A rigid system of governance based
upon illusive valuation models is simply unworkable. Pragmatic needs of
speed and efficiency, as well as the inability to determine accurately the group
holding residual claims, dictate a more fluid structure. Still, the non-
bankruptcy governance principles set forth in this Section provide important
127. In fact, valuation is such a difficult problem that the Code exhorts the parties to
come up with negotiated solutions to the issues rather than force a full-blown judicial valuation.
See supra text accompanying notes 28-43.
128. Baird provides the following example:
Posit a firm with two owners. One is Creditor, who is owed $10 in a month's
time, and another is Shareholder, who owns 100 percent of the firm's common
stock. Both are risk neutral. Firm's sole asset is a lottery ticket that gives the
owner a one in ten chance at a $100 prize. The drawing will take place in twenty-
nine days. As the senior investor, Creditor, other things being equal, will favor
converting the lottery ticket to $10 cash before the drawing. If Creditor is owed
$10, keeping the ticket instead of selling it exposes Creditor to a 90 percent
chance that he will not recover his investment. Yet in the cases in which Creditor
does recoup his investment, his recovery is limited by the amount of his claim. A
certain $10 is better than 10 percent chance of $10. Shareholder takes exactly the
opposite view. Once the ticket is converted into cash, he is certain to receive
nothing, while as long as the firm owns the ticket, he has a 10 percent chance of
receiving $90. The firm as a whole is worth the same whether it has the lottery
ticket or the proceeds from selling it, but in the first case the value of the
Creditor's interest is $1.00, and in the other case the value of Creditor's interest is
$10. If Creditor had the power to force Firm to convert the ticket into cash, he
would exercise it.
Baird, sripra note 8, at 131-32.
129. This can be expected precisely because of the problem posed, supra, at note 128.
130. This question is no different from the general question of who should hold the




guides to the resolution of particular conflicts in Chapter 11. Many decisions
made by managers in Chapter 11 are quite similar to those facing managers
generally. The governance process outside of Chapter 11 reflects a collective
view of the best method of organizing and controlling the decisionmaking pro-
cess in an efficient manner. Thus, observations regarding the incentives of
various groups, the proper role of fiduciary duties in the process, and the
desirability of some form of extra-judicial controls on managerial behavior can
inform the analysis of governance in Chapter 11.
III. THE BANKRUPTCY GOVERNANCE SYSTEM
Since the Securities and Exchange Commission's study of protective
committees in the 1930's,131 governance of firms in bankruptcy has been of
concern to those studying and practicing bankruptcy law. The Chandler
Act, 132 enacted in the late 1930's, provided a governance system that was
intended to place an independent trustee at the helm of the bankrupt public
corporation. 33 After substantial debate, 134 Congress, in enacting the Code,
rejected the requirement of a mandatory trustee in favor of leaving the debtor
in possession of its assets.1 35 Because a corporation can only act through
agents, the concept of a debtor in possession insures the debtor's prepetition
management a central role in the reorganization process.1 36
The conclusion that management should be left in control of the corpo-
ration's business decisions only opens the debate. Managerial cobtrol requires
regulation, but regulatory controls should be consistent with the purposes of
the process in which they are found. The special needs of the Chapter 11
process severely limit the non-bankruptcy governance system by eliminating
its contract and market aspects. Chapter 11 provides additional representa-
tional structures and judicial controls to counterbalance the resulting manage-
rial autonomy. This Section first analyzes the need for such limitations and
then describes Chapter 11's replacements for the contract and market con-
trols.
A. Bankruptcy Limitations on the Corporate Governance Structure
The bankruptcy of the Johns-Manville Corporation provides an excellent
example of the tension between the non-bankruptcy governance system and
the special problems encountered in the reorganization process. The Johns-
131. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, REPORT ON THE STUDY OF THE
WORK, ACTIVITIES, PERSONNEL AND FUNCrIONS OF PROTECrIVE AND REORGANIZATION
COMMrrEES (1937-1940). See Michael A. Gerber, The Election of Directors and Chapter 11
- The Second Circuit Tells Stockholders to Walk Softly and Carry a Big Lever, 53 BROOK. L.
REv. 295, 297-307 (1987), for a discussion of the SEC report.
132. 52 Stat. 840 (1938) (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 530, repealed).
133. See Gerber, supra note 131, at 300-03.
134. 11 U.S.C. § 1104(a) (1988) is a compromise between the House version of the bill
that ultimately became the Bankruptcy Code and a Senate Amendment. A discussion of the
Congressional debate over the question can be found in Robert J. Berden & Bruce G. Arnold,
Displacing the Debtor in Possession:'The Requisites For and Advantages of the Appointment of
a Trustee in Chapter 11 Proceedings, 67 MARQ. L. REV. 457, 460-69 (1984).
135. See 11 U.S.C. § 1104(a) (1988); Berden & Arnold, supra note 134, at 469.
136. Nimmer & Feinberg, supra note 2, at 21.
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Manville cases 137 involved a situation in which management and various
creditor groups, including the representatives of asbestos claimants, engaged
in three years of arduous negotiations over the terms of a reorganization plan.
Upon the distribution of an agreement that would have diluted shareholders'
equity by ninety percent, a member of the equity committee filed suit in a
Delaware court seeking an order requiring a shareholder meeting. Manville,
along with several other creditor constituencies, sought an injunction prohibit-
ing the meeting.
In granting the injunction, the bankruptcy court found that the express
purpose of any such meeting would be to replace the current Manville board
with directors who would be more sympathetic to the shareholders' inter-
ests. 138 In fact, the Equity Committee's conceded objective was to provide
the shareholders with negotiating leverage by attempting to scuttle the agree-
ment between Manville and its creditors. 139 The bankruptcy court also found
that the shareholders' efforts would jeopardize the debtor's ability ever to
confirm a plan of reorganization. 140
The Second Circuit reversed the bankruptcy court's injunction and held
that the shareholders' right to hold a meeting subsists during a Chapter 11
case. 14' The court went further and stated that the Equity Committee's desire
to obtain leverage over other participants in the reorganization did not
constitute "clear abuse" sufficient to justify enjoining the meeting.142 Rather,
the Second Circuit required a showing that the shareholders were bargaining
in bad faith by showing a "willingness to risk rehabilitation altogether to win a
larger share for equity."' 43 On remand, the bankruptcy court supplemented its
findings to include the required showing and again entered the injunction. 44
The question of whether shareholders' meetings should be allowed in
Chapter 11 aptly illustrates the difficulties encountered in the application of
general governance systems in Chapter 11. The ability to displace manage-
ment is an essential element of the non-bankruptcy governance system but is
normally granted to the residual claimants of the corporation's assets.
Granting the shareholders this right in Chapter 11 seems to imply that they
continue to occupy this position.
The Second Circuit recognized this problem but found that the solvency
of the corporation was not an issue: "We note that if Manville were deter-
mined to be insolvent, so that the shareholders lacked equity in the corpora-
137. In re Johns-Manville Corp., 52 B.R. 879 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1985), affd, 60 B.R.
842 (S.D.N.Y. 1986), rev'd, 801 F.2d 60 (2d Cir. 1986), on remand, 66 B.R. 517 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 1986).
138. Id. at 885.
139. Id. at 887.
140. Id. at 889.
141. 801 F.2d 60.
142. Id. at 64.
143. ld. at 65.
144. Several other cases have addressed the shareholder meeting problem. For an
exhaustive analysis, see Gerber, supra note 131, at 321-41.
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tion, denial of the right to call a meeting would likely be proper, because the
stockholders would no longer be real parties in interest."1 45
Thus, the Second Circuit recognized that traditional governance princi-
ples would focus on the solvency of the company in an attempt to find the
residual claimants.
Johns-Manville also illustrates the pragmatic limitations on the gover-
nance system. Johns-Manville was a case about leverage and strategic
behavior - not about higher principles of economic efficiency and monitor-
ing.1 46 The shareholder suit was intended to provide the shareholders addi-
tional leverage with which to negotiate a larger share of the reorganized cor-
poration.1 47 The Second Circuit was willing to condone the use of such
leverage but only up to the point at which it threatened to "torpedo the reor-
ganization." 148 Thus, the need to reorganize may be found to justify the limi-
tation of corporate governance principles. Indeed the bankruptcy court in
Johns-Manville embraced that very justification. 149
Pragmatic concerns also impair the governance system as it applies to
the creditors. Chapter 11 is designed to reduce the collective action problems
that diverse ownership interests create. Baird and Jackson have developed a
theory of bankruptcy that focuses on the collective action problems facing the
owners of a troubled company:
When the ownership of a firm is diverse and the individual
owners have different packages of rights ... all have an incentive
to take actions that will increase their own share of the assets of
an ailing firm, even if in doing so they deploy assets in a way that
a sole owner would not. Bankruptcy law, at bottom, is designed
to require these investors to act collectively rather than to take
individual actions that are not in the interests of the investors as a
group. 150
The automatic stay is the Code's principal means of fulfilling this policy.
In the absence of the stay, each creditor would have the incentive to take the
steps required to withdraw its capital from the enterprise. Because insolvency
presumes that assets are insufficient to satisfy each creditor's claim in full,
each creditor would have an incentive to be the first in line. The resulting
145. 801 F.2d at 65 n.6. The court's use of the term "party in interest" is somewhat
unfortunate because 11 U.S.C. § 1109(b) (1988) clearly includes equity interest holders within
the term "party in interest." See infra note 152.
146. The district court clearly recognized this fact:
By its own admission, the Equity Committee brought the [action seeking a share-
holder's meeting] in order to derail the proposed plan. Either the appellants seek
to destroy any prospect for a successful reorganization, or they wish to use the
threat of a new board as a lever vis-a-vis other interested constituencies and vis-a-
vis the current Manville board.
Johns-Manville, 60 B.R. at 852.
147. 801 F.2d at 64.
148., Id. at 64-66.
149. 66 B.R. at 542.
150. Diverse Ownership Interests, supra note 15, at 106.
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race under disparate debt collection systems would result in a breakup of
assets - a course of action that may not maximize overall asset values. 151
Thus, while necessary to obviate collective action problems, the auto-
matic stay guts the non-bankruptcy corporate governance structure. Once a
bankruptcy case is filed, contractual controls no longer effectively provide
creditors or shareholders the leverage needed to control the corporate man-
agers. Some replacements are necessary.
B. Bankruptcy Substitutes for Contract and Market Controls
Chapter 11 replaces the contractual and market aspects of the general
corporate governance framework with a system of owner representation and
with increased judicial oversight of management's actions. Judicial oversight
is both general and specific. Fiduciary duties and provisions for management
ouster make up general controls on managerial failure. These general gover-
nance controls work in a manner similar to legal constraints on managerial
misbehavior outside of bankruptcy. Judicial oversight also applies to specific
decisions. The decision to seek financing during the case, to assume or reject
executory contracts, and to sell assets are all subject to judicial oversight
using standards developed by the courts. The following discussion first looks
at the Code's owner representation provisions and then at these general and
specific controls on managerial actions.
1. Representation
The controls on management behavior in Chapter 11 rely to a great
extent on the ability of the owners to place control issues before the
bankruptcy court. While the Code provides any "party in interest" 152 the
ability to raise and be heard on any issue in the case,153 some system of rep-
resentation is necessary for two reasons. First, because a business usually
has many owners, negotiation and monitoring by all of the interested parties
would prove fruitless quickly. There is simply not enough room at the bargain-
ing table or in the courtroom (physically as well as figuratively) for everyone
to participate fully in the process. Second, not all owners will even desire
active involvement in the case. The costs of participation, both in terms of
managerial and legal time, may therefore effectively silence many owners in
the negotiation process. Owners with small claims may lack sufficient incen-
tives to invest the time and money that a true contribution may require. 15
151. BAIRD & JACKSON, supra note 60, at 40-41.
152. The Code does not define the term "party in interest" other than to state that the
term includes "the debtor, the trustee, a creditors' committee, an equity security holders' com-
mittee, a creditor, an equity security holder, or an indenture trustee." 11 U.S.C. § 1109(b)
(1988). Besides these interests, the term "party in interest" should include entities with an actual
stake in the outcome of the case. Compare In re Amatex, Inc. 755 F.2d 1034, 1042-43 (3d Cir.
1985) (future claimants, though not readily identifiable, have an interest in the case sufficient to
warrant the appointment of a legal representative with the status of a party in interest) with In re
Ionosphere Clubs, Inc. 101 B.R. 844, 849 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1989) (rejecting Consumers
Union's claim that its status as protector of the consumer warranted party in interest status).
153. 11 U.S.C. 1109(b) (1988).
154. This problem is similar to the rational indifference hypothesis posed, supra, at text
accompanying notes 81-83. Bankruptcy actually may exacerbate the problem because creditors'
claims normally will be reduced through the process. If the assets of the business will yield a
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The Code addresses this difficulty through the provisions requiring the
appointment of a creditors' committee - the central body representing the
unsecured creditors in a Chapter 11 case. Section 1102 of the Code requires
the United States Trustee to appoint a committee of creditors holding unse-
cured claims as soon as is practicable after the commencement of the case.
155
The committee is charged with the responsibility of participating in plan
formulation and of advising creditors on any plan filed in the case.156 The
committee also has monitoring and investigative responsibilities 157 to
counterbalance the informational and other advantages of management. 58 As
the chief representative of what is often the largest group of interested parties,
the committee may wield broad influence over the course of the
proceedings. 159
Because the committee is the primary negotiating body for such a large
group of claimants, the representative character of the committee members is
essential. In the modem world of corporate finance, the term "unsecured
creditors" can be misleading in its apparent simplicity. The term includes
creditors with a wide range of priorities and potentially conflicting incentives.
Holders of senior unsecured debt can have quite a different perspective on the
reorganization than do creditors holding junior subordinated debt. 60 Also,
employees holding claims for-unpaid wages and trade creditors may be willing
to forgo repayment of much of their debt if necessary to assure the reorgani-
zation of the company.' 6'
The Code addresses this problem by providing the court with authority
to appoint additional committees if necessary to assure adequate representa-
tion.162 Balanced against the need for adequate representation, however, is
the need to contain costs and keep the number of negotiating parties to a
payment to creditors of ten cents on the dollar, creditors will have even less incentive to invest
the time and to expend the funds required for a meaningful contribution.
155. 11 U.S.C. § 1102(a) (1988).
156. 11 U.S.C. § 1103(c)(3) (1988).
157. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1103(c)(1), (2) & (4).
158. See infra text accompanying notes 249-51.
159. In approving a creditorsO committee's request for reimbursement, the Ninth Circuit,
in In re George Worthington Co., 921 F.2d 626 (9th Cir. 1990), stated:
Under the scheme adopted by the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 [the code],
i.e., with the bankruptcy judge removed from active participation in the case and
the preference for leaving the debtor in possession, a § 1102 committee has a
more important role in terms of monitoring the debtor's business life and develop-
ing the terms of the plan of reorganization.
Id. at 633 (quoting In re GHR Energy Corp., 35 B.R. 539, 543 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1983)).
But see Jerome R. Kerkman, The Debtor in Full Control: A Case for Adoption of the
Trustee System, 70 MARQ. L. REV. 159, 183 (1987) (studies of bankruptcy cases indicate that
creditors' committees were "active!' in only 16%-38% of the Chapter 11 cases studied).
160. Secured creditors find their place at the bargaining table through the unique nature
of their claims rather than through a committee structure. The Code's provisions governing the
plan of reorganization require a classification of claims and generally require that secured credi-
tors each be placed in a separati class for purposes of treatment under the plan and voting. See
11 U.S.C. § 1122(b) (1988). Separate classification requires that secured creditors be included
individually in the negotiations leading to a consensual plan of reorganization. Thus, the tradi-
tional secured lender will not require a separate representational structure.
161. See In re Altair Airlines, 727 F.2d. 88, 90 (3d Cir. 1984).
162. 11 U.S.C. § 1102(a)(2) (1988).
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manageable level. Courts have recognized this difficulty and countenance a
high level of conflict in the committee structure.163
The Code also provides for the appointment of equity security holders'
committees if necessary to assure adequate representation of shareholder
interests.164 Courts use three guidelines to analyze the question of whether an
equity committee is appropriate. First, courts are more likely to appoint a
committee if the number of shareholders is large. Second, an equity commit-
tee is more likely to be appointed if the case is particularly complex. Finally,
the court must consider whether the benefits of a committee significantly
exceed the costs. 165 To the extent that management does not align itself with
the interests of shareholders, a committee representing their interests in the
plan process may be appropriate. 166
2. General Controls
a. Fiduciary Duties.
One of the most fundamental principles of bankruptcy governance
requires that the management of the bankrupt corporation act as a fiduciary of
the corporation. 67 This relatively simple statement is the center around which
bankruptcy governance issues revolve, but like many exhortations in the law,
the notion does little standing alone to resolve actual conflicts among
economically interested parties. As a guiding principle, the rule says much.
As a real means of sorting out the conflicts among diverse owners, however,
the rule says little.
The bankruptcy fiduciary duty points management in the direction of
acting in the interests of both creditors and shareholders. 168 Management is
called upon to operate the business in accordance with this principle -
maximizing the value of the assets of the reorganizing company while attempt-
ing to sort out the conflicts among pre-bankruptcy owners in some reasoned
way. 69 This role necessarily places management in a conflicting position in
163. See, e.g., In re Baldwin United Corp., 45 B.R. 375, 376 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1983)
("Conflicts among creditors are inevitable in all bankruptcy cases."); In re Texaco Inc., 79 B.R.
560, 567 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1987) ("Dissident factions of the same class of creditors are not
automatically entitled to separate committees."); In re Sharon Steel Corp., 100 B.R. 767, 776-
80 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1989) (exhaustive review of cases in which inherent conflicts did not rise
to the level sufficient to justify appointment of a separate committee).
164. 11 U.S.C. § 1102 (1988).
165. Johns-Manville, 68 B.R. at 159-60; In re Mansfield Ferrous Castings, Inc., 96
B.R. 779, 781 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1988).
166. See S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1978) (purpose of allowing court
to appoint an equity security holders' committee is "to counteract the natural tendency of a debtor
in distress to pacify large creditors, with whom the debtor would expect to do business, at the
expense of small and scattered public investors.").
167. "[T]he willingness of courts to leave debtors in possession is premised upon an
assurance that the officers and managing employees can be depended upon to carry out the fidu-
ciary duties of a trustee." Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Weintraub, 471 U.S. 343
(1985), on remand, 776 F.2d 1049 (7th Cir. 1986). See also Wolf v. Weinstein, 372 U.S.
633, 651, reh'g denied; 373 U.S. 928 (1963); In re Johns-Manville Corp., 60 B.R. 612
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1986); Nimmer & Feinberg, supra note 2, at 25.
168. Nimmer & Feinberg, supra note 2, at 2-4.
169. Id. at 25-29.
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making actual decisions. 170 The interests of -the various creditors and
shareholders almost always will be in conflict in the Chapter 11 process
because the process involves a zero sum game in which there will be winners
and losers. Because some party must operate the business and control the
process, management seems as well suited as any group to make the tough
decisions called for by the collapse. Thus as a general principle, the fiduciary
duty notion seems to direct management to do the best it can in a difficult sit-
uation.
Hortatory principles are important in the law because most people take
them to heart and try to live by them. The fiduciary duties of management in
Chapter 11 are no exception. In most cases, one can cast aside cynicism and
expect managers to act on the basis of what they perceive to be the common
good. Still, the law must provide controls for those other cases and probably
should provide more specific limitations on managers than a generalized man-
date to do good as they perceive it.
The actual rules implementing the fiduciary duty principle in bankruptcy,
like those existing outside of bankruptcy, cannot be expected to align man-
agement completely with the interests of all of its constituencies. Bankruptcy
courts recognize the difficulties of judging managerial discretion under the
fiduciary standard and have developed rules that echo the dual standards of
loyalty and care existing in the non-bankruptcy governance regime.
In cases of clear conflict, such as self-dealing, and in cases of direct vio-
lation of statutory duties,17 1 the courts hold management to the strictest of
standards. 172 In one of the most enduring statements of management's duty of
loyalty in bankruptcy, Justice Douglas wrote:
A director is a fiduciary. So is a dominant or controlling
stockholder or group of stockholders. Their powers are powers in
trust. Their dealings with the corporation are subjected to rigor-
ous scrutiny and where any of their contracts or engagements
with the corporation is challenged the burden is on the director or
stockholder not only to prove the good faith of the transaction but
also to show its inherent fairness from the viewpoint of the corpo-
ration and those interested therein.173
170. Id. at 2; Case, supra note 124, at 398-405.
171. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1106, 1107 (1988) (The duties of the debtor in possession
include accounting for all property received, furnishing information to any party in interest,
determining taxes from operating the business, and filing a plan of reorganization). The duties
of the debtor include filing a list of the creditors and a schedule of assets and liabilities. The
debtor is also required to cooperate with the trustee, if one has been appointed. See 11 U.S.C. §
521(b)(3) (1988).
172.
A trustee is held to something stricter than the morals of the market place. Not
honesty alone, but the punctilio of an honor the most sensitive, is then the stan-
dard of behavior. As to this there has developed a tradition that is unbending and
inveterate. Uncompromising rigidity has been the attitude of courts of equity
when petitioned to undermine the rule of undivided loyalty by the disintegrating
erosion of particular exceptions.
Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928) (citation omitted).
173. Pepper, 308 U.S. at 306 (citations omitted).
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The standards existing inside of bankruptcy do not differ much from the
standards outside of the process. 174 Thus, bankruptcy courts have held that
managers have breached their fiduciary duty where they trade in claims
against the corporation,175 use estate assets to pay creditors with whom they
expect to deal in future enterprises,176 use assets to pay claims owed by the
managers, 77 and allow relatives to use estate assets without compensating the
estate. 78 Each of these actions involves a direct conflict resulting in
misbehavior and, not surprisingly, the courts are quick to condemn such
actions.
In contrast to the court's strict review of transactions presenting an
actual conflict of interest is their deference to managerial discretion in situa-
tions uncomplicated by such conflicts. In analyzing management actions that
fall under the Code's grant of authority to operate the business, 179 courts use
language reminiscent of the business judgment rule. For example, in In re
Johns-Manville,l80 the creditors' committee objected to the debtor's use of
estate funds to pay lobbyists representing it in connection with pending legisla-
tion. In overruling the objection the court stated:
[T]he Code favors the continued operation of a business by a
debtor and a presumption of -reasonableness attaches to a
debtor's management decisions.... Where the debtor articulates
a reasonable basis for its business decisions (as distinct from a
decision made arbitrarily or capriciously), courts will generally not
entertain objections to the debtor's conduct.' 8'
Thus, the business judgment standard exists in the analysis of fiduciary
duties in bankruptcy. 182 The reasoning behind this deference is not different
from that existing outside of bankruptcy. Management is better suited than
the courts to make decisions requiring business judgments. 8 3
b. Replacing Management
The Code's provisions allowing the court to replace the management of
the corporation constitute a second general governance control. Like fidu-
ciary duties, this aspect of the Chapter 11 governance structure effectively
controls serious concerns over management's ability to run the corporation,
but may be ineffective to check management misbehavior in situations other
than those involving a direct conflict or other serious management problems.
174. See In re Schipper, 112 B.R. 917, 919 (Bankr. N.D. IU. 1990), afj'd, 933 F.2d.
513 (7th Cir. 1991).
175. See Wolf, 372 U.S. 633, 647.
176. See In re Weber, 99 B.R. 1001, 1013 (Bankr. D. Utah 1989).
177. See In re Plaza Family Partnership, 95 B.R. 166, 172 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 1989).
178. See In re E. Paul Kovacs & Co., 16 B.R. 203, 205 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1981).
179. See infra text accompanying notes 224-34 for an analysis of the limits of the debtor
in possession's operating authority.
180. 60 B.R. 612.
181. Id. at 615-16 (citations omitted).
182. See Richmond Leasing Co. v. Capital Bank, N.A., 762 F.2d. 1303, 1311 (5th
Cir. 1985); In re Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp., 103 B.R. 672, 690 (Bankr. W.D. Pa.
1989).
183. "Disagreements over business policy are not amenable to judicial resolution." In re
Curlew Valley Assocs., 14 B.R. 506, 513 (Bankr. D. Utah 1981).
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The primary means of replacing management is by a motion requesting
the appointment of a trustee under Section 1104 of the Code. Courts univer-
sally hold that the appointment of a trustee is an "extraordinary remedy." 184
The presumption remains that management should continue to operate the
business, and that the displacement of management is a remedy to be granted
only on clear and convincing evidence that the appointment is warranted.
Section 1104185 provides two bases upon which the court may rest an
order appointing a trustee. The first of these grounds, contained in Section
1104(a)(1), is "cause, including fraud, dishonesty, incompetence, or gross
mismanagement of the affairs of the debtor by current management, either
before or after the commencement of the case, or similar cause."' 8 6 This
language dovetails into the general fiduciary duty of loyalty owed by manage-
ment to the corporation's creditors and shareholders. Appointment for cause
is intended to remedy obvious instances of management misbehavior rather
than subtle conflicts or general control problems.
The second ground for the appointment of a trustee, contained in
Section 1104(a)(2), requires that "such appointment is in the best interest of
creditors, and equity security holders, and other interests of the estate."1 87
This language provides the courts the flexibility to "eschew rigid absolutes and
look to the practical realities and necessities." 88 Courts consider the following
factors: "(i) the trustworthiness of the debtor; (ii) the debtor in possession's
past and present performance and prospects for the debtor's rehabilitation; (iii)
the confidence - or lack thereof - of the business community and of
creditors in present management; and (iv) the benefits derived by the
appointment of a trustee, balanced against the cost of the appointment."' 89
While the necessity of removing management in circumstances of fraud
or dishonesty seems clear enough,190 the removal of management for gross
mismanagement or under a best interests test requires further analysis. These
somewhat broader bases for appointment of a trustee appear to provide courts
184. See, e.g., In re Ionosphere Clubs, Inc., 113 B.R. 164, 167 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
1990); In re Cardinal Indus., Inc., 109 B.R. 755, 765 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1990); In re
Microwave Prods. of Am., 102 B.R. 666, 670 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. 1989); In re Sharon Steel
Corp., 86 B.R. 455, 457 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1988), afTd, 871 F.2d 1217 (3d Cir. 1989); In" re
Nautilus of New Mexico, Inc., 83 B.R. 784, 788 (Bankr. D.N.M. 1988); In re McCorhill
Publishing, Inc., 73 B.R. 1013, 1016-17 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1987); In re Parker Grande Dev.,
Inc., 64 Bankr. 557, 560 (Bankr. S.D. Ind. 1986); In re Colby Constr. Corp., 51 B.R. 113,
116 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1985); In re Evans, 48 B.R. 46, 47 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1985); In re
L.S. Good & Co., 8 B.R. 312, 314 (Bankr. N.D. W. Va. 1980); In re Hotel Assocs., Inc., 3
B.R. 343, 345 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1980).
185. 11 U.S.C. § 1104(a) (1988).
186. Id. § 1104(a)(1). This section of the Code specifically states that cause does not
include "the number of holders of securities or the amount of assets or liabilities," thus reflecting
the outcome of the debate over whether a trustee should be appointed in cases involving "public
companies." See supra note 134.
187. 11 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(2).
188. Ionosphere Clubs, 113 B.R. at 168; Hotel Assocs., 3 B.R. at 345.
189. Ionosphere Clubs, 113 B.R. at 168 (citations omitted).
190. Even in cases where management has engaged in actions which are dishonest,
however, the bankruptcy court retains the discretion to deny a motion for the appointment of a




with an opportunity to address general managerial shirking and the failure of
management to closely align itself with the interests of the residual claimants.
Courts do not appear to be taking this opportunity, however.
The flexibility of Section 1104(a)(2) and the breadth of the term
"mismanagement" are tempered by the restrictive attitudes of the courts in
the application of the standards. Courts recognize that mismanagement has
usually occurred to some extent in all bankruptcy cases and hold that the
management should be given an opportunity to correct past mistakes. 191
"Gross mismanagement suggests some extreme ineptitude on the part of
management to the detriment of the organization." 192 Furthermore, the fact
that someone else may operate the business more effectively is not grounds
for the appointment of a trustee.193 Except in extreme cases, something more
than managerial quality is at issue in these decisions.
What is usually at the heart of the cases ordering the appointment of a
trustee is either some management conflict of interest 94 or a judicial real-
ization that a lack of creditor confidence in the abilities of management has
reached crisis proportions. 195 Like fraud or dishonesty, little needs to be said
here of the cases involving direct conflict. They clearly and directly fit within
the broad notions of the duty of loyalty under the fiduciary standards existing
inside and outside of the Chapter 11 process. 196
Of more interest in this analysis are the cases involving a loss of confi-
dence in the management of the debtor. If handled under appropriate stan-
dards, these cases could provide an adequate substitute for the loss of con-
tractual controls resulting from the pragmatic needs of the reorganization pro-
cess. The only question 197 is whether the standards used by courts are
adequate to the chore.
An examination of the cases in which courts have reviewed a request
for appointment of a trustee based upon a lack of creditor confidence yields
few general observations. It appears, however, that the lack of confidence in
191. See, e.g., Evans, 48 B.R. at 47.
192. In re Mako, Inc. 102 B.R. 809, 812 (Bankr. E.D. Okla. 1991) (citing In re
Brown, 31 B.R. 583 (D.D.C. 1983)).
193. See Microwave Prods., 102 B.R. at 671.
194. See In re Sharon Steel Corp., 871 F.2d 1217 (3d Cir. 1989) (careless management
practices including payments without consideration to chief executive officer); Nautilus, 83 B.R.
784 (co-owner president also manager and largest creditor); McCorhill Publishing, 73 B.R.
1013 (prepetition transfers to affiliates and failure to maintain complete records); Colby Constr.,
51 B.R. 113 (majority shareholder use of corporate assets and failure to maintain accurate
records); In re Concord Coal, Corp., 11 B.R. 552 (Bankr. W.D. W. Va. 1981) (loyalty of the
management called into question by many competing businesses and potential for inter-company
dealings).
195. See, e.g., Cardinal Indus., 109 B.R. 755 (creditors' crisis of confidence in man-
agement).
196. In fact, one basis of the court's recognition of the necessity of the appointment is
that the conflicts impair the ability of the debtor to act as a fiduciary. Thus, some courts collapse
the fiduciary duty analysis discussed earlier into the appointment analysis. See, e.g., Microwave
Prods., 102 B.R. at 671-72; Sharon Steel, 871 F.2d at 1227-28.
197. Of course, one might object that the judicial process is incapable of making such




these cases typically accompanies a lack of progress in plan negotiations, 198
continuing losses during the case, 199 doubts in the ability of the debtor to
reorganize, 200 failure to provide information to the participants,20 1 or direct
violation of statutory requirements.20 2 Generally, unless the lack of confidence
approaches critical proportions, courts are reluctant to grant the extraordinary
remedy of appointing a trustee. 2 03
There are good reasons for the courts to set high standards for displac-
ing management and appointing a trustee. One of the main reasons is the high
cost such an appointment will entail. Trustees and their lawyers must be
paid.204 Bankruptcy is an expensive proposition to begin with, and a trustee
may add unnecessarily to those costs. Courts are extremely sensitive to cost
issues205 and will be understandably reluctant to add to the number at the
trough. Also, there is no assurance that a trustee who has had no prior rela-
tionship to the business of the corporation will do any better job in running the
business than current management. Finally, courts must be alert to the under-
lying motive driving the motion for appointment.206 These problems indicate
that some balance is required.
The courts' reluctance to appoint a trustee renders this governance
control, like the fiduciary duty control, an inadequate substitute for the con-
198. See Ionosphere Clubs, 113 B.R. at 169; Cardinal Indus., 109 B.R. at 766. See
supra text accompanying notes 28-43 for a discussion of the plan negotiation process.
199. See, e.g., Ionosphere Clubs, 113 B.R. at 169; Cardinal Indus., 109 B.R. at 762.
200. See, e.g., Hotel Assocs., 3 B.R. at 345; LS. Good, 8 B.R. at 315.
201. See, e.g., Cardinal Indus., 109 B.R. at 762; Colby Constr., 51 B.R. at 117.
202. See, e.g., Evans, 48 B.R. at 48.
203. In addition to the appointment of a trustee, two other means of replacing manage-
ment are worthy of note. Courts in a few cases have approved the appointment of new man-
agement outside of the restrictions provided in 11 U.S.C. § 1104. These cases generally
involve special circumstances, such as consent of management or a complete lack of manage-
ment. See, e.g., In re Gaslight Club, Inc., 782 F.2d 767 (7th Cir. 1986) (management consent
to the appointment of a "responsible officer"); In re United Press Int'l, Inc., 60 B.R. 265
(Bankr. D.D.C. 1986) (consent order abolishing the debtor's board of directors upheld); In re
Boileau, 736 F.2d 503 (9th Cir. 1984) (consent to appointment of examiner with authority to
operate the business); In re John Peterson Motors, Inc., 47 B.R. 551 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1985)
(same); In re FSC Corp., 38 B.R. 346 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1983) (court appointed "responsible
officer" where corporation had no management or board of directors when it filed petition). Cf.
In re Lifeguard Indus., Inc., 37 B.R. 3 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1983) (court refused to approve new
management slate proposed by majority shareholder).
The second method of replacing management may be for shareholders to call a meeting
under state corporate statutes. See supra text accompanying notes 137-49. Because most cor-
porations in Chapter 11 can be presumed to be insolvent, however, a shareholders' meeting
likely grants control over management to the group that is least likely to have the appropriate
incentives to insure that management makes decisions that will maximize the value of the busi-
ness. See supra text accompanying notes 76-80.
204. 11 U.S.C. § 330 (1988) (The court may award reasonable compensation for ser-
vices by the trustee, examiner, or professional person.); Id. § 327 (The trustee, with court
approval, may hire an attorney or any other professional person to assist the trustee in his or her
duties.).
205. See, e.g., Parker Grande Dev., 64 B.R. at 561; Microwave Prods., 102 B.R. at
676; Cardinal Indus., 109 B.R. at 766.
206. Courts should be vigilant against motions for the appointment of a trustee moti-
vated by tactical considerations unrelated to the quality of existing management. See In re Stein
and Day, Inc., 87 B.R. 290, 295 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1988).
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tractual aspects of the non-bankruptcy governance system. The high stan-
dards used by courts, while understandable, result in a rigidity that renders the
control ineffective to counteract any split between management and its
constituencies. This observation should not be taken as a call for increased
use of trustees, however. The remedy is indeed drastic - so drastic that
courts should continue to see it not as a substitute for the contract and market
aspects of corporate governance, but rather as a continuation of the purely
legal controls on extreme management misbehavior.
Short of the extraordinary remedy of appointing a trustee, the Code
provides the court the authority to appoint an examiner.207 Facially, the Code
requires the court to order the appointment upon the request of a party in
interest208 in cases in which fixed, unliquidated, unsecured claims exceed $5
million. 209 A few courts have, however, refused to appoint an examiner even
in these larger cases, 210 and commentators have called for the abandonment of
mandatory appointments. 211 In smaller cases, the court may order the
appointment only on a showing that the appointment is in the best interests of
the creditors.2 12
The statutory language suggests that the functions of an examiner are
investigatory. Section 1104(b) provides that the examiner may be appointed
"to conduct such an investigation of the debtor as is appropriate, including an
investigation into any allegations of fraud, dishonesty, incompetence, miscon-
duct, mismanagement or irregularity in the management of the affairs of the,
207. 11 U.S.C. § 1104(b).
208. Courts also have the authority to appoint an examiner sua sponte. See, e.g., In re
Public Serv. Co. of New Hampshire, 99 B.R. 177, 182 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1989); In re UNR
Indus., Inc., 72 B.R. 789, 793-95 (Bankr. N.D. II. 1987); In re Landscaping Servs., Inc., 39
B.R. 588, 590 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 1984).
209. 11 U.S.C. § 1104(b)(2).
210. See, e.g., In re Revco D.S., Inc., 93 B.R. 119 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1988), appeal
dismissed, 99 B.R. 778 (N.D. Ohio 1989), rev'd, 898 F.2d 498 (6th Cir. 1990) (appointment
premature since two committees actively investigating leveraged buy-out); In re GHR Cos., 11
Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d (MB) 604, 615-16 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1984) (section 1104(b)(2) only
applies to public companies); In re Shelter Resources Corp., 35 B.R. 304, 305 (Bankr. N.D.
Ohio 1983) ("[Tt slavishly and blindly follow the so-called mandatory dictates of Section
1104(b)(2) is needless, costly and non-productive and would impose a grave injustice on all
parties herein."). These cases may be somewhat aberrational because since they were decided,
the Supreme Court has made clear that bankruptcy cases should be decided strictly on the basis
of the clear language of the Code. See United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235
(1989); Toibb v. Radloff, 111 S. Ct. 2197 (1991).
211. See CONCLUSIONS OF THE PANELS, THE WILLIAMSBURG CONFERENCE ON
BANKRUPTCY - CRITIQUE OF THE FIRST DECADE UNDER THE BANKRUPTCY CODE AND
AGENDA FOR REFORM, Transcript 3 (ALI-ABA 1989) (concept of mandatory appointment of
examiner should be eliminated); Lawrence K. Snider, The Examiner in the Reorganization
Process: A Need to Modify, 45 BUS. LAW. 35,55 (1989) (same).
212. 11 U.S.C. § 1104(b)(1). This best interest standard should not be confused with
the similarly worded standard for the appointment of a trustee under 11 U.S.C. § I 104(a)(2).
Appointment of an examiner does not displace management as does appointment of a trustee.
Examiners' primary functions are investigatory, not managerial. See infra text accompanying
notes 213-14. Thus, the standard for the appointment of an examiner should not be as high as
that required for the appointment of a trustee. See Snider, supra note 211, at 37; 5 COLLIER ON
BANKRUPTCY § 1104.03[h] (15th ed. 1991).
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debtor."21 3 Section 1106, which details the duties of the examiner, continues
this investigatory theme.214
Notwithstanding the statutory emphasis on managerial misconduct, the
scope of the examiner's inquiry may be broad.215 In In re UNR Industries,21 6
for example, the court ordered the examiner to "determine whether
negotiations toward a consensual plan of reorganization [were] at an
impasse."21 7 UNR involved numerous complex issues arising out of the
corporation's potential liability to persons injured by asbestos. 2 18 The court
was concerned particularly about the possibility of a cramdown because of the
difficulty of these issues, the resolution of which was expected to consume at
least five years. 2 19 Apparently, the examiner was successful because the
UNR plan was confirmed on June 1, 1989.220
Several courts have broadened the examiner's role further, charging the
examiner with the mediation of disputes over the plan of reorganization, 221
bringing suits on behalf of the estate,222 and, in a few cases, operating the
debtor's business. 223 In these cases, the courts have recognized that an
examiner may fulfill the need for an impartial voice in the process while
avoiding the disruption created by the appointment of a trustee.
3. Judicial Control over Specific Decisions
In addition to the general controls on managerial actions, the Code
requires managers contemplating significant corporate actions to obtain judi-
cial approval. This requirement constitutes an important replacement of the
contract and market controls operating outside of the Chapter 11 process.
The following discussion describes the limits of managerial authority and the
standards for approval of significant financing, executory contract, and asset
sale decisions.
213. 11 U.S.C. § 1104(b).
214. 11 U.S.C. § 1106(a)(3) (1988) requires the examiner to "investigate the acts, con-
duct, assets, liabilities, and financial condition of the debtor, the operation of the debtor's busi-
ness and the desirability of the continuance of such business, and any other matter relevant to the
case or the formulation of a plan." Section 1106(a)(4) requires the examiner to file a statement
of any investigation conducted and to transmit a copy to the creditors' committees.
215. For a general discussion of one examiner's experiences in a large reorganization,
see Stanley A. Kaplan, The Role of the Examiner: Some Observations, 4 BANKR. DEV. J. 439
(1987).
216. 72 B.R. 789.
217. Id. at 795. See also Landscaping Servs., 39 B.R. at 591 (examiner charged with
investigating whether the confirmation standards had been met as well as the debtor's good
faith); In re Apex Oil Co., 92 B.R. 847, 851 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1988) (examiner investigated
proposed sale of assets to insiders).
218. UNR Indus., 72 B.R. at 791-92.
219. Id. at 793.
220. UNARCO Bloomington Factory Workers v. UNR Indus., Inc., 124 B.R. 268,
271 (Bankr. N.D. I11. 990).
221. See, e.g., Public Serv. Co., 99 B.R. at 182 (examiner appointed to mediate the
effort to arrive at a consensual plan of reorganization).
222. See In re Carnegie Int'l Corp., 51 B.R. 252, 254 (Bankr. S.D. Ind. 1984).
223. See, e.g., Boileau, 736 F.2d 503; John Peterson Motors, 47 B.R. 551.
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Sections 363224 and 364225 provide the limits on the general operational
authority of management226 of the corporate debtor in possession. Section 363
generally provides that the debtor in possession may enter into transactions
affecting the property of the estate and may use property of the estate,
without notice and a hearing, so long as such transaction or use is "in the
ordinary course of business." 227 Section 364 provides the same rule for
financing. 228 Executory contract assumptions always are subject to the
court's approval.229 A corporation may enter into transactions other than in
the ordinary course of business; however, the corporation may conclude these
transactions only with the approval of the bankruptcy court.230 In defining this
limit, the Code allocates decisionmaking authority between the management of
the business and the court in its dispute resolution role.
Courts have developed a two-part test to determine whether a'transac-
tion is entered in the ordinary course of business.2 31 The test focuses on both
prior practice of the debtor232 and what is ordinary in the debtor's industry.233
Management's actions must meet both prongs of the test.234
The ordinary course of business limit provides a relatively good mecha-
nism to allocate decisionmaking along tactical and strategic lines. Not all
decisions are significant. Owners have agreed in their contracts to allow
management significant discretion over the normal operations of the business,
and the bankruptcy process should, to a certain extent, respect this allocation
of authority. As decisions become more significant, however, the lack of a
complete set of governance controls requires increased judicial scrutiny.235
One area in which courts provide such scrutiny is the financing of the
corporation during the Chapter 11 process. As noted earlier, financing
arrangements may involve significant asset deployment and financial restruc-
turing issues that cannot be addressed through the normal negotiation pro-
cess.236 Courts have recognized this fact most directly in analyzing lending
224. 11 U.S.C. § 363 (1988).
225. 11 U.S.C. § 364 (1988).
226. The Code's general authorization to operate the business is contained in 11 U.S.C.§ 1108 (1988), which provides, "Unless the court, on request of a party in interest and after
notice and a hearing, orders otherwise, the trustee may operate the debtor's business." 11
U.S.C. § 1107(a) (1988) allows the "debtor in possession" to exercise all of the rights, powers,
and duties of the trustee. If the debtor in possession is a corporation, management exercises this
authority. See Nimmer & Feinberg, supra note 2, at 23.
227. 11 U.S.C. § 363(c)(1).
228. 11 U.S.C. § 364(a).
229. 11 U.S.C. § 365.
230. 11 U.S.C. § 363(b)(1); 11 U.S.C. §364 (b),(c) & (d).
231. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Harrison v. Estate of Deutscher, 115 B.R. 592,598
(M.D. Tenn. 1990); In re Dant & Russell, 853 F.2d 700, 704 (9th Cir. 1988); Johns-Manville,
60 B.R. at 616-18.
232. This aspect of the test of ordinariness is known as the "vertical dimension or credi-
tor's expectation test." See Johns-Manville, 60 B.R. at 616.
233. This test is called the "horizontal dimension or industry-wide test." See id. at 618.
234. See Dant & Russell, 853 F.2d at 705.
235. Cf. In re Schipper, 933 F.2d 513, 516 (7th Cir. 1991); Nimmer & Feinberg, supra
note 2, at 37, 70.
236. See supra text accompanying notes 44-69.
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arrangements involving cross-collateralization and other enhancements pro-
vided to the existing secured creditor. 237
In In re Vanguard Diversified, the court developed a four-part test for
the appropriateness of cross-collateralization clauses:
(1) Absent the proposed financing, the business operations
will not survive...; (2) [the'debtor] is unable to obtain alternative
financing on acceptable terms...; (3) the proposed lender will not
accede to less preferential terms; and (4) the proposed financing
is in the best interests of the general creditor body.238
The test is widely used by, courts in analyzing cross-collateralization
clauses.239
The Vanguard list seems to reflect qualitative rather than governance
concerns. Management freed of contractual constraints by the Chapter 11
process is second-guessed by the bankruptcy court 240 as to the need for
financing (part 1), their negotiation skills (parts 2 and 3), and their cost-benefit
analysis (part 4).
In contrast to the judicial scrutiny of financing decisions, courts give
deference to management's decision to assume or reject executory contracts.
Courts uniformly state that the decision to assume or reject an executory
contract is a matter committed to the business judgment of the debtor's man-
agement.241 Thus, even though the decision is one that may impact the asset
deployment and financial restructuring issues facing the business owners,242
and even though the Code requires judicial approval of the executory
contracts decision, 243 courts seem loathe to exercise their authority to scru-
tinize management's actions in this area.
The final broad area of judicial oversight is the requirement of judicial
approval after a notice and a hearing of use, sales,, or leases of assets outside
237. See generally Emergency Preferential Orders, supra note 53, at 80-85.
238. In re Vanguard Diversified, 31 B.R. 364, 366 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1983).
239. Professor Tabb has, in several articles, fully developed the analysis of preferential
clauses (such as cross-collateralization) in financing arrangements. See Emergency Preferential
Orders, supra note 53; Cross-Collateralization, supra note 56; Charles J. Tabb, Lender
Preference Clauses and the Destruction ofAppealability and Finality: Resolving a Chapter 11
Dilemma, 50 OHIO ST. L.J. 109 (1989) [hereinafter Appealability and Finality]. Professor
Tabb argues that such preferential clauses should be refused in all cases unless Congress tight-
ens procedural and substantive requirements for the judicial approval of such clauses.
240. In most cases, the bankruptcy court will indeed be the final arbiter of the appropri-
ateness of such orders. 11 U.S.C. § 364(e) provides that the reversal or modification on appeal
of financing orders will not affect the rights granted to lenders unless such order is stayed. See
generally Appealability and Finality, supra note 239.
241. See, e.g., Lubrizol Enters. v. Richmond Metal Finishers, 756 F.2d 1043, 1046
(4th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1057 (1986); In re Prime Motor Inns, 124 B.R. 378,
381 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1991); In re Blackstone Potato Chip Co., 109 B.R. 557, 560 (Bankr.
D.R.I. 1990); In re Southern California Sound Sys., Inc., 69 B.R. 893, 898 (Bankr. S.D. Cal.
1987); In re Anglo Energy Ltd., 41 B.R. 337, 340 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1984).
242. See supra text accompanying notes 59-65.
243. 11 U.S.C. § 365(a).
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of the ordinary course of the debtor's business. 2 " Courts, in analyzing these
decisions, generally use a sliding scale of review under which they more
closely scrutinize the management's business judgment as the significance of
the sale increases.
Judicial review in this area also focuses primarily on the qualitative
aspects of the decision rather than the governance question concerning which
parties are advocating or resisting the sale. In In re Lionel Corp.,245 for
example, the Second Circuit reversed the order of the bankruptcy court
approving the sale of the debtor's 82% common stock interest in another
corporation. 246 In reversing the order, the court provided a list of factors
courts should consider in approving sales of substantial assets:
[T]he proportionate value of the asset to the estate as a whole,
the amount of elapsed time since the filing, the likelihood that a
plan of reorganization will be proposed and confirmed in the near
future, the effect of the proposed disposition on future plans of
reorganization, the proceeds to be obtained from the disposition...,
which of the alternatives of use, sale or lease the proposal envi-
sions and, most importantly perhaps, whether the asset is increas-
ing or decreasing in value.247
Many of these factors seem to relate to the quality of the business deci-
sion to sell the assets. 248
The effectiveness of judicial approval of specific decisions as a means
of controlling managerial behavior is limited by several pragmatic considera-
tions. The most obvious of these limitations is time. Decisions in Chapter 11,
like any other business decision, must be made in a timely manner.
Participants in the bankruptcy process usually do not have the luxury of the
many months (or even years) the adversarial process typically requires for
decisionmaking. Business decisions such -as these may be mooted by com-
plete business failure if they are not made quickly.
A difficulty created in part by the. lack of time is the problem of inade-
quate information. Owners wishing to contest managerial actions normally are
not afforded the opportunity to engage in the fact-finding typical in other
244. 11 U.S.C. § 363(b).
245. 722 F.2d 1063 (2d Cir. 1983).
246. Id. at 1064.
247. Id. at 1071.
248. In addition to the general qualitative concerns expressed by the Lionel court, courts
have further limited large asset sales in situations in which the sale constitutes a sub rosa plan of
reorganization. See, e.g., In re Continental Air Lines, Inc. 780 F.2d 1223 (5th Cir. 1986); In re
Braniff Airways, Inc. 700 F.2d 935 (5th Cir. 1983), reh'g denied; 705 F.2d 450 (5th Cir.
1983). See also Nimmer & Feinberg, supra note 2, at 15-20. The courts in these cases
approach the question of asset sales from a governance perspective by looking to the effect of the
transaction on asset deployment and financial restructuring issues. The judicial reaction to these
sales has been to require the issue to be determined within the plan process. See Braniff, 700
F.2d at 940 ("The debtor and the Bankruptcy Court should not be able to short circuit the
requirements of Chapter II for confirmation of a reorganization plan by establishing the terms of
the plan sub rosa in connection with a sale of assets."). TIis reaction may lead to an inability of
the owners to structure a rational business transaction with a third party. See supra text accom-
panying notes 28-43 for an analysis of the plan process.
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adversarial processes. Judges, therefore, may be presented with an incom-
plete or one-sided version of the facts necessary for rational decisionmaking.
Finally, although judicial review of particular decisions provides some
degree of control over managerial conduct when the conduct is affirmative,
the system may not address management's failure to act. Managers, by virtue
of their role in the debtors' day-to-day operations, have complete threshold
authority to determine whether to sell assets, seek financing from sources
other than the existing secured creditor, or seek less expensive replacements
for existing contractual arrangements. Unless the court is presented with a
fully negotiated deal, there is nothing to approve.
This is not to say that other parties may not undertake to negotiate such
transactions and seek court authorization and direction to the debtor's man-
agement to complete the transaction. The Code leaves managers in control,
but not in exclusive control. Other parties in interest may seek specific actions
through motions requesting relief from the automatic stay,249 conversion of the
case to one under Chapter 7,250 or through the -general authorization to raise
and be heard on any issue in the case.251 The problems with this method of
assumption of control are two-fold. First, management may enjoy
informational advantages over these other parties. Second, third parties may
be unwillhig to subject a fully negotiated transaction to the whims of a
bankruptcy court in an adversarial setting.
The representational structures and judicial controls provided by the
Chapter 11 process, therefore, may provide an inadequate replacement for the
market and contractual controls suspended during the case. Representation
can go only so far in the absence of effective means of controlling managers.
General judicial controls cannot be expected to provide true controls over
managerial actions because of the extreme nature of the remedy and the
countervailing need to provide managers some discretion over the corpora-
tion's business operations. Finally, judicial control over specific decisions is
unsatisfactory because it applies an adversarial process to what are essen-
tially business decisions. Full replacement of contractual and market controls
is certainly unrealistic given the pragmatic concerns of the process, but per-
haps we can come closer.
IV. THE PROBLEM WITH INADEQUATE MANAGERIAL
CONTROLS
Bankruptcy engenders a near complete breakdown of the status quo..
Most of our general assumptions about business liabilities are shaken to their
very core by a realization that assets are simply insufficient to cover liabilities.
Bankruptcy changes the rules in a number of areas. Why should governance
be any different?
Bankruptcy is indeed a unique process and special rules obviously must
apply, but governance issues present substantially the same problems inside
249. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(d) (1988).
250. See 11 U.S.C. § 1112(b) (1988).
251. See 11 U.S.C. § 1109(b) (1988).
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and outside of bankruptcy. The same conflicts among owners and between
owners and managers existing outside of Chapter 11 exist inside the process.
If anything, the immediacy of these conflicts is aggravated by the crisis atmo-
sphere surrounding the proceedings. The question is simply whether man-
agement is particularly well positioned to respond to the needs of all of the
participants even without a complete set of governance controls. The answer
requires an examination into the potential conflicts present in a reorganizing
business, and management's incentives in resolving these knotty problems on
a day-to-day basis.
Consider first the general incentives of the owners above and below the
line of insolvency. The owners with a priority so low that they likely would
receive no distribution under the absolute priority rule under any scenario of
asset deployment, herein called "junior owners," most likely have an incentive
to continue the operations of the business regardless of economic realities.
Because a liquidation of the corporation will reveal the inadequacy of the
assets to pay all prior claims, their securities are worthless under such a
scenario. This harsh fact obviously will color their views regarding the fun-
damental issues arising during the reorganization process.
The junior owners can be expected to opt for financing on any terms
available regardless of the possibility that such a course of action may amount
to throwing good money after bad. This group probably holds similar views
regarding the assumption of executory contracts necessary to the business
operations. Junior owners may resist sales of business assets because such
sales set the value of the assets sold and therefore limit the leverage of this
group during the plan negotiations.2 52 On almost any issue, junior owners will
have an incentive to argue for the result that prolongs the reorganization and
keeps as many assets together as possible.2 53
Next consider the group holding a priority which will yield full payment
on the liquidation of the business, the "senior creditors." Obviously, this group
will view the liquidation of the business as a desirable result regardless of the
existence of positive going concern value. Going concern value will not ben-
efit the senior claimants, 254 but they may bear the cost of a failed attempt at
reorganization. This fact will create an incentive to argue for the liquidation of
the business on an expedited basis. Thus, senior owners may be expected to
argue against financing the business operations on any terms and to argue for
the rejection, or assignment, of executory contracts needed to operate the
business and the sale of assets.255
252. See supra text accompanying notes 28-43.
253. "[Gleneral creditors and shareholders (who often have more to gain than to lose
from delay) may tend to be excessively optimistic and opt for reorganization when it is unwar-
ranted." JACKSON, supra note 35, at 189.
254. The corollary to the absolute priority rule will prohibit this group from receiving
more compensation from the reorganization than the amount of their claim. See supra note 36
and accompanying text.
255. This categorization admittedly does not take into account owners with incentives
outside of those provided by their ownership interests. For example, employees may have
prepetition wage claims that are of a priority to insure full payment in a liquidation. See 11
U.S.C. § 507(a)(3) (1988) (providing a priority for certain prepetition wage claims). These
employees may not necessarily be expected to see the liquidation of the business as being in their
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Somewhere in between falls the group that likely will be paid something
upon the liquidation of the business but likely will not be paid in full under any
scenario, the "residual owners." Like the residual owners outside of
bankruptcy, this group will approach decisionmaking on a true cost-benefit
basis. 256 Residual owners will decide their position on financing, the
assumption-of-executory-contracts and asset-sales issues on a case-by-case
basis since they will stand to benefit from correct decisions and to lose from
incorrect decisions. 57
Somewhere in this morass of conflicting incentives lies management. If
management can be expected to find and align itself with the residual
claimants, the reorganization should proceed on a more rational economic
basis. If, on the other hand, management's allegiances lie with junior or senior
owners, the perverse incentives held by the group may carry over to the
decisions made by management, perhaps setting an economically irrational
course for the reorganization.
Management alignment may be based on a number of factors the
overall effect of which is difficult to determine. Members of management
themselves may have an interest in retaining their jobs for as long as possible
because of their high level of firm-specific skills.258 As Professor Tabb has
pointed out, "management decisions almost inevitably are biased in favor of
survival." 259 This bias normally will cause management to align itself with the
interests of junior creditors and may result in management actions that have
the effect of prolonging the reorganization at all costs.
Obviously, this bias is directly increased by the extent to which man-
agers are also junior owners.260 In small, closely held corporations, owner-
managers may have most of their personal wealth tied up in the corporation. 261
If a liquidation will result in the elimination of that wealth, managers in this
situation will understandably seek to avoid such a result.2 62
best interests, however. Groups such as this can be expected to have clear incentives that may
be unrelated to the economic realities at issue in the business decisions. Thus, by broadening the
analysis to include these other incentives, these groups may be classified along the lines
proposed here.
256. See supra text accompanying notes 79-80.
257. "The difficult question is not one of a conflict of principles but rather one of ensur-
ing that the iesidual class - the unsecured creditors - make the decision whether acquiescence
in the demand is in their interests or not.' JACKSON, supra note 35, at 158.
258. See supra text accompanying notes 100-02. Unlike management in a solvent cor-
poration, managers of failed corporations also may have a general incentive to increase enterprise
risk. If managers risk losing their jobs during the reorganization process, they may be morelikely to gamble with estate assets hoping for a result that will give them the status of heroes.
259. Emergency Preferential Orders, supra note 53, at 79.
260. See Nimmer & Feinberg, supra note 2, at 38-41.
261. Id.
262. Nimmer and Feinberg draw a distinction between sole proprietorships and closely
held corporations. When analyzing governance issues involving the sole proprietorship, they
expect and condone a certain amount of owner self-interest because these reorganizations impli-
cate the "fresh start" policy of the Code. In closely held corporations, however, because the
owner-managers have not submitted to all of the burdens of the bankruptcy process, they should
function as a fiduciary to the estate. Id. The question that remains, however, is whether the
Chapter 11 governance system is adequate to insure that managers of close corporations will act
in such a manner.
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Of course, this bias and the ability of management to act on it are not
inevitable. One can envision cases in which managers would find their repu-
tation enhanced by an orderly liquidation rather than a messy attempt at reor-
ganization that ultimately fails. Also, in large cases with active creditors'
committees, creditors may have adequate leverage to counteract any bias of
management. 263 In their ground-breaking empirical study of large public
corporations, Professors LoPucki and Whitford found that "[t]he leverage
available to managers in large reorganization cases is not necessarily exer-
cised in favor of shareholders." 264 Thus, one cannot assume that managers
will always hold incentives that conflict with those held by the residual
claimants.
The size of the case may impact the effectiveness of the creditors'
committee and the general ability of management to raise itself above the fray
and act with independence for several reasons. Large cases in which hun-
dreds of millions of dollars are at stake will likely support a much more active
creditors' committee. The estate may be large enough to allow the committee
to appoint accountants and financial advisors as well as batteries of attorneys
whose full attention will be devoted to monitoring the case. 265 In addition, the
fact that the case involves a large corporation likely will mean that there will
be creditors with claims of a magnitude to warrant the ihvestment of
managerial time and attention needed for effective committee participation266
Large cases also may provide management some degree of insulation
from the pressures exerted by the shareholders. The management autonomy
created by a separation of ownership and control outside of bankruptcy267 may
exist inside of bankruptcy, 268 particularly if no equity committee is
263. Professor Michael Gerber cites two cases in which the creditors' committee was
successful in controlling management. In the reorganizations of both the Lionel and Johns-
Manville corporations, the replacement of two top officers was linked to pressure from creditors.
Gerber, supra note 131, at 348.
264. LoPucki & Whitford, supra note 4, at 150. Professors LoPucki and Whitford
have promised a separate article on the questions of how much leverage management has in large
cases and how they use it. Id. at 155 n.63.
265. 11 U.S.C. § 1103(a) (1988) allows the committee, with the approval of the court,
to employ professionals to assist it in carrying out its functions. Professionals are compensated
out of the estate as priority administrative expenses. II U.S.C. §§ 328, 503 (1988). This pay-
ment assumes that the estate will have sufficient assets to make the payment, however. Further,
requests for compensation are subject to review by the court for reasonableness. Id. § 328.
266. The recent explosion in "claims trading" (i.e. purchasing claims against a Chapter
11 debtor) may provide additional benefits in this regard. A claims buyer may have sufficient
capital invested in the corporation to wan-ant the buyer's undertaking of a significantrole in the
Chapter 11 process. See Chaim J. Fortgang & Thomas M. Mayer, Trading Claims and Taking
Control of Corporations in Chapter 11, 12 CARDOZO L. REV. 1, 6-7 (1990). On the other
hand, this phenomenon may have ill effects since those buying claims may avoid participation
through the committee structure because of the heightened duties of committee members. Id. at
115.
267. See supra text accompanying notes 80-82.
268. Of course, if the bankruptcy court exercises its discretion to enjoin shareholders'
meetings, management's insulation from shareholders will be on the same level as its autonomy
from creditors. See supra text accompanying notes 136-48. To the extent that corporations in





The creditors may have less ability to control management in reorgani-
zations of smaller corporations. Because fewer dollars are at.stake, creditors
may lack the incentive to make the commitments of time and attention
required to monitor and control management. Also, the estate may not be of
sufficient size to support the professionals necessary to assist the creditors'
committee in offsetting management's control.
Studies bear out the premise that creditor control is not an effective
counterbalance to managerial incentives in smaller cases. In a study of
Chapter 11 cases filed in the Western District of Missouri during the period
between October, 1979 and October, 1980, LoPucki found that Chapter 1l's
procedural mechanisms to control management failed to achieve their
intended purpose. 70 The study included forty-eight Chapter 11 cases
involving businesses with scheduled assets ranging from a high of $15 million
to one business with no scheduled assets.271 Most of the cases studied
involved small debtors.272
LoPucki's data revealed that creditors' committees were appointed in
"a minority of the cases" 273 and that these committees "usually failed to obtain
assistance from an attorney, accountant, or other person familiar with the
reorganization process."274 The data also disclosed that examiners were
seldom appointed and that trustees were appointed only after the debtor had
abandoned the business. 275 Overall, the data led LoPucki to conclude that
"[t]ogether the effect of these system failures was that the debtors studied
were able to continue in complete control of their businesses while they were
under the jurisdiction of the court."276 Later studies have indicated a similar
lack of effective controls on managerial behavior.277
The analysis thus far has seen bankruptcy as a simple extension of the
problems facing corporate owners generally. In reality, the problems created
by financial failure affect a dramatically larger group. The specter of
bankruptcy conjures up images of lost jobs, idled plants, and failure of many
other small businesses that had come to rely on the failed company as a
source of supply.
The extent to which a bankruptcy system can or should accommodate
these other very real effects of business failure has been a matter of recent
269. See supra text accompanying notes 163-65.
270. Lynn M. LoPucki, The Debtor in Full Control - Systems Failure Under Chapter
11 of the Bankruptcy Code? - First Installment, 57 AM. BANKR. L. 99 (1983) [hereinafter
Debtor in Full Control I]; Lynn M. LoPucki, The Debtor in Full Control - Systems Failure
Under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code? - Second Installment, 57 AM. BANKR. LJ. 247
(1983) [hereinafter Debtor in Full Control 11].
271. Debtor in Full Control I, supra note 270, at 120-21.
272. Only 11 companies studied had assets in excess of $1 million. Id.




277. See Kerkman, supra note 159.
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debate.278 One school of thought, led by Baird and Jackson, sees bankruptcy
as a collective debt collection device in which the relative non-bankruptcy
rights of all of the participants in the business enterprise should be respected.
Perhaps employees, suppliers, and consumers should have rights that may be
affected by the reorganization, but those rights are properly the subject of non-
bankruptcy law.279 The introduction of new rights in a bankruptcy case can
only lead to forum shopping and a consequent decision to use the bankruptcy
process when it is not the best method of resolving the problems facing the
company.280
The alternative view, most recently championed by Professor Elizabeth
Warren, rejects this elegant view of the process as being too simplistic. 281 A
firm's failure implicates many interests beyond those faced by nonbankrupt
companies. Bankruptcy is viewed as a loss distribution device necessitated by
a generalized contractual breakdown that state law rights cannot, and were
not intended to, accommodate.282 This view leaves room for consideration of
the effect of the process on groups that are not technically creditors or
shareholders.283
A concern regarding the analysis of the bankruptcy governance frame-
work set out here may be that it fails to take into account these other con-
stituencies affected by the reorganization process. The ineffective control
over managers by the corporate owners may result in a failure to maximize
value, but value is only one piece of the puzzle. If management has incentives
to at least attempt reorganization, everyone may be better served.
Management's incentives may save jobs or at least delay the liquidation,
thereby softening the landing.
One response to this concern is that the question of what interests
bankruptcy should protect is one that deserves full philosophical debate. It is
not a question to be submerged in the quagmire of bankruptcy decisionmaking.
As a purely descriptive matter, the general corporate reorganization provisions
of the Code do not take account of non-owner interests. 284 In general, the
Code speaks in terms of creditors and interest holders and not in terms of
communities or dependents. Still, bankruptcy judges sometimes take the pub-
lic interest into account in their decisions on specific questions, 28 5 and
278. This debate is set forth in particularly sharp focus in Elizabeth Warren, Bankruptcy
Policy, 54 U. CH. L. REV. 775 (.1987); and Douglas G. Baird, Loss Distribution, Forum
Shopping, and Bankruptcy: a Reply to Warren, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 815 (1987).
279. See Baird, supra note 278, at 822-24.
280. Id. at 824-26.
281. See Warren, supra note 278, at 797-800.
282. Id. at 789-93.
283. Id.
284. Cf. 11 U.S.C. § 1165 (1988). Subchapter IV of Chapter 11 governs railroad reor-
ganizations. Section 1165, contained in Subchapter IV, specifically requires the court and
trustee to consider the public interest in considering many of the fundamental issues arising in
railroad cases. Section 1165 has no counterpart in the Code's provisions governing general cor-
porate reorganizations.
285. See, e.g., Ionosphere Clubs, 113 B.R. at 170-71.
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Congress, in enacting the Code, amply illustrated its concern with jobs and
community dependents.2
The extent to which judicial philosophy is geared toward the protection
of parties other than creditors and shareholders will never be known as long
as the courts are not forced to make decisions on the basis of protecting these
non-owner interests. At least facially, most opinions look to the specific effect
of the decision on the creditors and shareholders of the business and not to the
other interests affected by the outcome. If the protection of non-owner inter-
ests is driving judicial decisions within the governance framework, that moti-
vation should be directly stated.
Even if the analysis starts with the proposition that the reorganization
process should take the interests of the broader community into account, the
governance system produces problems. One cannot assume that manage-
ment, acting in its own self interest, necessarily will take actions that are con-
sistent with the broader goal of distributing the losses occasioned by the col-
lapse of the corporation. Even if one assumes that management's incentives
will be directed toward the continued operation of the business, one cannot
extend the analysis further to assume that the reorganization process is the
best method available to distribute losses among the wide range of partici-
pants. These other interests should be served by a system that takes direct
account of all of the losses caused by the business failure and balances the
losses of non-owners directly against those of the owners. Management may
not be the best group to undertake such a balancing.
V. A PROPOSED BANKRUPTCY GOVERNANCE MODEL
A tension between pragmatism and theoretical economic efficiency
pervades the problem of corporate governance in Chapter 11. Although man-
agement may be the group best suited to run the business from a practical
perspective, individual managers may hold incentives that are inimical to the
goal of maximizing the value of the business assets. One must tread lightly
over this minefield.
The Code's bias in favor of the continuation of existing management is
evidence of this tension. One of the most controversial issues facing the
drafters of the Code was whether a trustee should be required in cases involv-
ing "public" companies. Like many of the issues arising in the bankruptcy
arena, the question is one of the need for representation of interested parties
and the complete elimination of conflict versus the pragmatic need for speedy
and simplified procedures for the reorganization of troubled companies. After
some back and forth debate between the House and the Senate, Congress
opted for leaving the operation of the business with the debtor in possession,
and, for the most part, the approach has been useful in streamlining the pro-
cess.
Leaving operational control with the prepetition managers makes sense
for several reasons. Management is familiar with the business operations and
has information necessary to the operation of the business that may not be
286. See H.R. REP No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 220 (1977).
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found in the business records. The appointment of a trustee may cause a
delay in the progress of the case while the trustee gathers information neces-
sary to the fulfillment of his or her duties. Further, the loss of all control over
the course of the bankruptcy case may create a disincentive for managers to
file a bankruptcy petition even when bankruptcy is the most effective means
of sorting out the problems of business. Thus, managers should be left in at
least operational control of Chapter 11 debtors.
For the most part, a structure for controlling managerial behavior exists
in Chapter 11. Because the contractual aspects of the non-bankruptcy gover-
nance system must be suspended in bankruptcy, the process must rely to a
large extent on judicial controls over managerial actions. Chapter 11 provides
ample opportunity for judges to exercise that control.
This Article is not intended to advocate any structural changes to the
Code's governance mechanism. Instead, what is needed is simply a shift in
attitude. Courts should recognize that fiduciary duties and the mechanisms
available to replace managers are insufficient to control managers fully.
Outside of bankruptcy, fiduciary duties compose only one part of a broader
governance framework, much of which is suspended during the pendency of
the Chapter 11 case. Given the suspension of contractual aspects of the non-
bankruptcy governance system, courts must realize that management is
placed in a position of autonomy; particularly in smaller cases in which no
active creditors' committee exists.
To some extent, courts can counteract this autonomy through the
approval processes required for fundamental corporate transactions entered
during the case. In making a decision whether to approve such a transaction,
courts should be sensitive to the fact that what they are facing is in large part
a governance question. The group seeking approval of transactions involving
financing, the assumption of executory contracts, and asset sales is as impor-
tant as a judicial determination of the qualitative aspects of such transactions.
The question is not so much whether a decision is correct as it is to whom to
listen in making the determination.
Corporate governance principles existing outside of the Chapter 11 pro-
cess suggest an approach to judicial decisionmaking that revolves around the
court's view of where the residual claims lie. If courts could locate the group
holding the residual claims and give more weight to that group's view of the
particular decision at issue, courts could provide a rough substitute for the
contractual and market aspects of the governance system.
The problem that remains is finding the group. The question involves
the determination of asset values and amount of liabilities - complex prob-
lems to which much of the bankruptcy process is devoted. Although this
complexity may render such an analysis ineffective as a total solution to the
problems of governing the corporation in Chapter 11, it does not necessarily
render such a approach completely devoid of usefulness.
In many cases, general observations may provide estimates of asset
values that are at least reliable enough to make clear that certain parties may
occupy the role of senior or junior owners even if the exact group holding
residual claims is not as definite. If a case involves a corporation that is
clearly insolvent, common stockholders' views on the desirability of a particu-
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lar transaction involving asset deployment and financial restructuring issues
should be discounted in favor of the views of the general unsecured creditors.
Similarly, a fully secured creditor's insistence upon a course of action that may
result in the cessation of business operations should be provided less weight
than a creditors' committee's opposition to that action.
This approach would require a court to consider the debtor's solvency
in its analysis of contested business decisions. Parties could put on proof of
asset values and liabilities in order to support or attack a particular decision.
For instance, this approach would allow a creditors' committee to show that
the shareholders occupy the role of junior claimants and that the shareholders'
views on the need for a particular financing transaction, therefore, should be
discounted. Also, if the committee could show that the unsecured creditors
represented by the committee occupy the role of residual claimants, the court
should afford the committee's views greater weight.
Recognizing the difficulty of determining where the line of solvency
should be drawn, the court's consideration of the issue should be only a factor
in its decision. Cours already are using multi-factored analyses in considering
asset sale and financing issues. While executory contract decisions currently
are not subject to particularly strict scrutiny, similar standards can and should
be used. Determining which group holds the residual claims could be fit
within the mix of factors for all of these decisions.
The weight given to this factor should increase as the clarity of the
proof regarding solvency increases. Some cases may lend themselves well to
the analysis from early on in the proceedings. In more cases, asset values will
be less clear. In such cases, the residual claim analysis may be most useful as
an exclusionary factor rather than a controlling factor. It likely will be easier
for a court to conclude that a particular group, shareholders, for example, is
not composed of residual claimants than it is to find that another group is. In
this sense, the residual claim analysis normally should be used to require sim-
ply that the views of the junior or senior owners be supported by more com-
pelling proof of business justification.
Of course, there are cases in which the residual claim analysis will not
point the court in a clear direction. In such cases, courts may be unable to
make even a rough estimate of the group holding residual claims or may find
no clear support or opposition from the owners of the corporation to a particu-
lar management proposal. In these cases courts must necessarily explore
qualitative aspects of the decisions because of the possibility that manage-
ment's incentives are aligned with those of a group which does not stand to
gain or lose from the particular decision.
The decisions in these cases also may be accompanied by more general
governance problems. A lack of clear direction from owners and inability to
find the corporation's residual owners may infect the entire process and raise
managerial autonomy to its highest levels. Judicial supervision may be the last
hope for realistic control over the process.
Providing judicial controls over managerial behavior in this environment
places a good deal of strain on judicial resources, however. Bankruptcy
courts, like any other court, must rely on adversarial processes to develop the
full range of facts and options before realistic judicial oversight can occur. To
1992]
ARIZONA LAW REVIEW
the extent that a case is too small to warrant significant owner participation in
this process, managers will win by default. One obvious solution to this prob-
lem is the appointment of a trustee by the court. As discussed above, how-
ever, such a course eliminates many benefits of the current process.
The appointment of an examiner may be a useful middle ground
between leaving management in unfettered control and the replacement of
management with a trustee. Courts can leave management in operational
control, thus reaping the benefits of managerial continuity, while using an inde-
pendent fact-finder for selected issues. When the court is uncomfortable with
the controls over management in a particular case, an examiner may be an
effective voice in the case.
A few courts already have discovered the advantages of granting an
examiner powers going beyond investigation of possible wrongdoing by parties
to the case. Several courts have granted examiners the authority to mediate
disputes, bring suits, and operate the debtor's business.287 The selective use of
examiners to assist the court in remedying particular governance problems
may be a growing trend.
Examiners, like trustees, are not without costs. Again, pragmatism
often will impair the full vindication of rights that may be adversely affected by
management control. The problem may be particularly acute in smaller cases.
Because smaller cases result in inadequate creditor participation, the gover-
nance problems may be greater. At the same time, smaller cases may not
have adequate assets to support the fees an examiner may require.
Effective investigation by an examiner need not require full batteries of
lawyers and accountants in small corporate cases, however. Most of the
issues with which this article is concerned are purely business issues relating
to the appropriate deployment of assets. A selective use of an examiner as an
independent fact-finder on these business issues may not be prohibitively
expensive. The examiner may counteract the control of management in these
decisions simply by presenting to the court a contrary view.
CONCLUSION
Business failure brings the divergent economic incentives of the busi-
ness owners directly into conflict. In all corporate settings, creditors with
fixed-return contracts seek to minimize the risk of the business entity while
stockholders may have an incentive to increase overall risk. Nowhere is this
conflict more apparent than in the reorganization of an insolvent corporation.
Creditors with a priority in assets will insist on a course of action that mini-
mizes the risk that the asset values required to insure payment will not be
realized. If liquidation of the corporation's assets will provide the senior credi-
tors payment in full, these creditors will find an immediate sale to be in their
best interest. Equity owners who may not participate in any distribution of
assets on the liquidation of the insolvent corporation will seek to delay the
liquidation and withdrawal of capital as long as possible. Through delaying a
liquidation of the business assets, shareholders may capture some of the cor-
287. See supra text accompanying notes 214-22.
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poration's value. The continuation of the business increases the risk that the
asset values may deteriorate. This risk is borne by those creditors whose
priorities would have assured them payout if the business had been immedi-
ately liquidated.
Many decisions faced. by the managers of a Chapter 11 debtor in pos-
session involve choices that implicate the conflicting incentives of claimants
with differing priorities. Transactions such as the sale of assets, financing, and
the assumption or rejection of executory contracts raise issues that directly
bear upon the risk of the business entity. These transactions are of such
weight and character that they ultimately may determine the course of the
bankruptcy case and the postpetition character of the debtor.
Much of the debate surrounding these decisions has focused on qualita-
tive aspects. This focus is misplaced. Like any other business, a corporation
in Chapter 11 is faced with many possible courses of action, each of which is
necessarily uncertain. Corporate law has recognized the difficulty of deter-
mining whether corporate officers and directors have made "correct" deci-
sions. The law of corporate governance instead focuses on the agency rela-
tionship, providing standards by which the agent may be judged and a means
through which the agent may be removed and replaced. Thus, the law's role
in corporate decisionmaking is relegated to the process of decisionmaking and
not to the quality of decision. To the extent possible, decisionmaking in
bankruptcy should be no different.
The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 dramatically changed the gover-
nance of corporations reorganizing under its provisions by eliminating the
requirement of a mandatory independent trustee. The chief purpose behind
the presumption that the debtor's management would continue to run the busi-
ness was to reduce the disruption of the general business operations through-
out the reorganization process. The concept of a "debtor in possession" left
management with far broader powers, however.
Under the Code, management is the focal point for strategic decisions
faced by the Chapter 11 debtor. This role provides management the ability to
subtly influence the fundamental decisions directly affecting the deployment of
the business assets and the ultimate distribution of those assets or of claims
against those assets. Management's informational advantages, together with
this influence, provide a high degree of leverage over the prepetition- owners
and claimants.
This control and leverage is similar to that existing in solvent corpora-
tions outside of Chapter 11. The complexity and size of modem corporations
often require some degree of separation of control from ownership. Courts,
legislators, and commentators have long struggled over the governance prob-
lems created by this separation. Corporate law provides a governance struc-
ture for the resolution of these problems that incorporates legal, contractual,
and market constraints into an integrated system that addresses most of the
problems created by the need to separate decisionmaking from ownership.
Importing general corporate governance principles into bankruptcy pro-
vides an incomplete solution to the special problems facing creditors and
equity owners of a corporation operating under Chapter 11. The creditors'
inability to enforce their contractual protections and the resulting lack of mar-
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ket discipline eliminate important protections not adequately addressed by the
court's extension of management fiduciary duties to them. Alternatively, if
management perceives its interest to be more closely aligned with the senior
creditors, junior creditors and equity holders may find themselves without an
effective voice in the reorganization process.
These difficulties go beyond issues of creditor/shareholder protection
and fairness to reach to the economic justification for reorganization. If
bankruptcy is believed to be simply a process for redeployment of assets and
redistribution of claims against those assets on an economically efficient basis,
management control and allegiances may introduce opportunities for strategic
behavior that is inconsistent with the rationale of the process. Corporations
that economically should be liquidated may be reorganized and vice versa. If,
on the other hand, bankruptcy is viewed as a means through which losses can
be distributed to pre-bankruptcy claimants while the corporation undergoing
the process stays in business and continues to contribute to the community
through providing employment, paying taxes, etc., the same strategic influ-
ences may infect the process.
The solution to these difficulties requires little structural reform. In
many cases, courts may be able to approximate the non-bankruptcy gover-
nance system by including a determination of the corporation's asset value in
the other factors they use to evaluate contested business decisions. By
determining the asset value, courts may determine which group holds the
residual claims on the corporation's assets. Like the non-bankruptcy system,
the court could then give the views of that group on the business decision the
most weight in the decision making process.
In addition to this approach, courts should continue to rely on the advan-
tages an impartial third party may bring to the reorganization process. Courts
have broadened their use of examiners to provide a middle ground between
extreme alternatives of appointing a Chapter 11 trustee and continuing the
debtor in full possession. The Code's drafters' desire to provide continuity of
management in the day-to-day operations of the business has been realized
and has been successful. However, the appointment of an examiner to moni-
tor management's operation of the debtor, to serve as a focal point for nego-
tiations over fundamental transactions, and to offset the informational advan-
tages of management can do much to counterbalance the managerial control
that has come to characterize Chapter 11.
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